{"id":12117,"date":"2010-11-08T11:25:08","date_gmt":"2010-11-08T16:25:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=12117"},"modified":"2010-11-08T11:25:08","modified_gmt":"2010-11-08T16:25:08","slug":"the-new-miranda-warning","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2010\/11\/the-new-miranda-warning\/","title":{"rendered":"The New Miranda Warning"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/a>\"\"<\/a>I never thought the Miranda<\/em> warning was all that useful.\u00a0 In fact, it actually raises more questions than it answers.\u00a0 For example, the warning tells a suspect that anything he says can be used against him in court.\u00a0 But asking for an attorney is saying something, isn\u2019t it?\u00a0 Could the prosecutor later use such a request against him?\u00a0 (After all, television teaches us that only guilty people \u201clawyer-up.\u201d)\u00a0 And what if the suspect wants to remain silent?\u00a0 Could his silence be used against him in court?\u00a0 The Miranda<\/em> warning fails to answer these and many other questions.<\/p>\n

\u00a0Making matters even worse for the would-be defendant is Berghuis v. Thompkins<\/em>, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).\u00a0 In a confidence inspiring 5-4 split, the Court ruled that a suspect cannot actually exercise the right to remain silent by remaining silent\u2014even if that silence lasts through nearly three hours of interrogation.<\/p>\n

\u00a0In response to all of this chaos, I\u2019ve drafted a new and improved Miranda<\/em> warning.\u00a0 Granted, this warning would be a bit more cumbersome for police to deliver, and still wouldn\u2019t answer every possible question.\u00a0 But it would be an improvement.\u00a0 Here it goes:<\/p>\n

“I first have to read you these rights before you tell me your side of the story, okay?\u00a0 First, you have the right to remain silent.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Actually, you really don\u2019t have the right to remain silent, unless you first speak. Berghuis v. Thompkins<\/em>, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).<\/li>\n
  2. But if you choose to speak so that you can remain silent, you had better not be ambiguous.\u00a0 If you tell me, for example, \u201cI don\u2019t got nothing to say,\u201d that is ambiguous to me, and not because of the double negative.\u00a0 Your ambiguity will be construed in my favor, and I am allowed to continue my interrogation. United States<\/em> v. Banks<\/em>, 78 F.3d 1190 (7th<\/sup> Cir. 1996).\u00a0<\/li>\n
  3. On the other hand, if I <\/em>am ambiguous when I read you your rights, my ambiguity will also be construed against you.\u00a0 This is only fair.\u00a0 Florida<\/em> v. Powell<\/em>, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).<\/li>\n
  4. If you refused to answer questions posed to you before<\/em> I began reading you your rights, your pre-Miranda<\/em> silence can<\/em> be used against you at trial, should you testify in your own defense.\u00a0 So, you might want to talk to me now so you don\u2019t look guilty later. \u00a0Jenkins v. Anderson<\/em>, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).\u00a0<\/li>\n
  5. But, anything you say to me can be used against you in court.\u00a0 (I\u2019m not sure if this includes the things that you say in order to remain silent.)<\/li>\n
  6. You have the right to an attorney.\u00a0<\/li>\n
  7. But if you choose to exercise your right to an attorney, once again, you had better not be ambiguous about it.\u00a0 Don\u2019t ask me, for example, \u201cCould I get a lawyer?\u201d\u00a0 This might seem like a reasonable request to you, since you\u2019re handcuffed and have no other way to actually get the nameless attorney that I just offered you.\u00a0 However, this statement is also ambiguous and is not sufficient to invoke your rights. United States<\/em> v. Wesela<\/em>, 223 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2000).<\/li>\n
  8. If you can\u2019t afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you, unless your income happens to be above the 1980 poverty line.\u00a0 Then you might be on your own.\u00a0<\/li>\n
  9. And don\u2019t say \u201cI can\u2019t afford a lawyer but is there any way I can get one?\u201d\u00a0 As you might have guessed by now, that is completely ambiguous, and lacks \u201cthe clear implication of a present desire to consult with counsel.\u201d\u00a0 The interrogation, therefore, must go on. Lord v. Duckworth<\/em>, 29 F.3d 1216 (7th<\/sup> Cir. 1994).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Now, do you understand these rights as I have read them to you, and would you like to take this opportunity to help yourself, waive your rights, and tell your side of the story?”\u00a0<\/p>\n

    Michael D. Cicchini<\/strong> is a criminal defense lawyer and author of But They Didn\u2019t Read Me My Rights! Myths, Oddities, and Lies about Our Legal System<\/em> (Prometheus Books, 2010) as well as articles on criminal and constitutional law, available here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    I never thought the Miranda warning was all that useful.\u00a0 In fact, it actually raises more questions than it answers.\u00a0 For example, the warning tells a suspect that anything he says can be used against him in court.\u00a0 But asking for an attorney is saying something, isn\u2019t it?\u00a0 Could the prosecutor later use such a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":97,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[80,30,24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12117","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constitutional-interpretation","category-criminal-justice","category-us-supreme-court","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12117","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/97"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12117"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12117\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12117"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12117"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12117"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}