{"id":12190,"date":"2010-11-16T16:44:34","date_gmt":"2010-11-16T21:44:34","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=12190"},"modified":"2010-11-16T16:44:34","modified_gmt":"2010-11-16T21:44:34","slug":"scotus-to-address-requirements-for-federal-murder-statute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2010\/11\/scotus-to-address-requirements-for-federal-murder-statute\/","title":{"rendered":"SCOTUS to Address Requirements for Federal Murder Statute"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yesterday, the Supreme Court <\/em>agreed to decide what \u201cfederal nexus\u201d must be proven in a murder prosecution under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C). \u00a0The statute makes it a federal crime to kill \u201canother person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense.\u201d \u00a0The specific question before the Court is whether a defendant may be \u201cconvicted of murder under \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C) without proof that information regarding a possible federal crime would have been transferred from the victim to federal law enforcement officers or judges.\u201d \u00a0Additionally, the case presents interesting questions regarding the interpretation of statutory state-of-mind requirements and the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

The decision below was\u00a0United States v. Fowler<\/em>, 603 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2010). \u00a0Here\u2019s what happened. \u00a0<\/p>\n

Fowler and others were preparing to rob a bank when a municipal police officer stumbled upon them. \u00a0The officer was immediately suspicious \u2014 no doubt because the men were wearing dark clothes and gloves on a warm spring day in Florida \u2014 and actually recognized one of Fowler\u2019s companions from previous robberies. \u00a0The men succeeded in disarming the officer and eventually killed him.<\/p>\n

Fowler was convicted of the murder, but argued on appeal that the government failed to prove a sufficient federal nexus for the crime. \u00a0Specifically, Fowler argued that the government must prove it was likely that the victim would have communicated information about a federal offense to federal authorities. \u00a0Bank robbery is, of course, a federal offense, but would the slain cop have informed federal agents of Fowler\u2019s intended crime? \u00a0It is certainly plausible, but the government apparently failed to introduce any evidence to that effect.<\/p>\n

No matter, held the Eleventh Circuit. \u00a0The lower court observed, \u201cIn construing the statute [as he did], Fowler focuses on the victim\u2019s state of mind instead of, as the statute requires, the\u00a0defendant\u2019s<\/em> state of mind.\u201d<\/p>\n

I think the court was correct in this criticism of Fowler\u2019s position. \u00a0The statutory language about communicating information to a federal agent appears after the phrase \u201cwith intent to.\u201d \u00a0As I read it, this is a pure state-of-mind element and requires no proof of what the slain officer actually would have done.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, I\u2019m not sure the Eleventh Circuit quite ended up in the right place, either. \u00a0The court held that there must merely be a \u201cpossible or potential communication to federal authorities\u201d (as opposed to a likely communication). \u00a0Although the court\u2019s holding is not entirely clear in this regard, it sounds to me like the court may have made a similar mistake to Fowler\u2019s by converting a subjective, state-of-mind requirement into an objective element. \u00a0The real question, which I don\u2019t see the Eleventh Circuit clearly recognizing, is whether Fowler had the intent to prevent communication with a federal agent. \u00a0Even though such communication was objectivelypossible<\/em>, it may be that the possibility never actually occurred to Fowler before the killing. \u00a0If so, he is not guilty of violating \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C).<\/p>\n

Given the way the question is framed for the Supreme Court, the Court may not need to clarify the culpability requirements of \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C). \u00a0However, I would welcome a reaffirmation by the Court of the need for lower courts to engage with statutory culpability requirements in a careful, rigorous fashion. \u00a0These are, after all, absolutely central to the justification of punishment and the determination of offense severity.<\/p>\n

Another interesting dimension of\u00a0Fowler <\/em>is the federalization issue. \u00a0Once upon a time, federal criminal law was regarded as a very small, narrowly focused field, with state law regarded as the nation\u2019s basic source of criminal law to address \u201creal crime\u201d \u2014 murder, rape, robbery, burglary, etc. \u00a0As many scholars have documented, however, there has been an unprecedented federalization of criminal law over the past few decades, with the feds increasingly taking over prosecution of \u201cstreet crime.\u201d \u00a0Fowler <\/em>is a case in point. \u00a0One might think that murder of a local cop is more a matter of local concern than federal concern, but \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C) creates a possibility of federal prosecution.<\/p>\n

Is such federalization a bad thing? \u00a0There are respectable arguments on both sides of the question. \u00a0What is clear is that the Eleventh Circuit\u2019s approach to \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C) authorizes federal prosecution just about any time a criminal suspect kills an investigating officer or informant. \u00a0Given the growing reach of federal criminal jurisdiction, it will almost always be possible to find a\u00a0possible <\/em>communication regarding a\u00a0possible <\/em>federal crime.<\/p>\n

Cross posted at Life Sentences Blog<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yesterday, the Supreme Court agreed to decide what \u201cfederal nexus\u201d must be proven in a murder prosecution under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1512(a)(1)(C). \u00a0The statute makes it a federal crime to kill \u201canother person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United 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