{"id":13646,"date":"2011-06-11T11:47:41","date_gmt":"2011-06-11T16:47:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=13646"},"modified":"2011-06-11T11:47:41","modified_gmt":"2011-06-11T16:47:41","slug":"seventh-circuit-says-begay-and-chambers-must-be-applied-retroactively","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2011\/06\/seventh-circuit-says-begay-and-chambers-must-be-applied-retroactively\/","title":{"rendered":"Seventh Circuit Says Begay and Chambers Must Be Applied Retroactively"},"content":{"rendered":"

Retroactivity has been in the news a lot lately, thanks to the U.S. Sentencing Commission\u2019s\u00a0ongoing consideration of whether to give already-sentenced defendants the benefit of more favorable crack guidelines<\/a>. But crack defendants are not the only inmates serving extraordinarily long terms based on recently discarded aspects of federal sentencing law. \u00a0Earlier this week, the Seventh Circuit approved retroactivity for another category of such inmates in\u00a0Narvaez v. United States <\/a><\/em>(No. 09-2919)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court\u2019s recent decisions in\u00a0Begay<\/em> and\u00a0Chambers <\/em>substantially narrowed the reach of the Armed Career Criminal Act\u2019s fifteen-year mandatory minimum. \u00a0(For background, see\u00a0this post<\/a>. \u00a0Ironically, shortly after\u00a0Narvaez <\/em>was decided, the Court issued its opinion in\u00a0Sykes v. United States<\/em>, which seemed to back away from<\/a> Begay<\/a><\/em>.) \u00a0Five years before\u00a0Begay<\/em>, Luis Narvaez pled guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines based on his prior convictions for \u201cviolent felonies,\u201d including two convictions for failure to return to confinement in violation of Wis. Stat. \u00a7 946.42 (3)(a). \u00a0Later, in\u00a0Chambers<\/em>, the Supreme Court ruled that the Illinois crime of failing to report for confinement did not count as a \u201cviolent felony.\u201d \u00a0Narvaez then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 to vacate his sentence in light of\u00a0Chambers<\/em>. \u00a0The district judge held that\u00a0Chambers<\/em> did not apply retroactively, but granted Narvaez a certificate of appealability.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

On appeal, the government conceded that <\/em>Begay\u00a0and <\/em>Chambers, <\/em>as decisions of substantive criminal law, applied retroactively, and that, under <\/em>Chambers<\/em>, Narvaez\u2019s failure-to-return convictions were not \u201cviolent felonies\u201d for purposes of the career offender guideline. \u00a0However, the government argued that Narvaez could not take advantage of\u00a0Chambers<\/em> because he raised only a statutory issue in his petition \u2014 in order to get a certificate of appealability, a \u00a7 2255 petitioner must make \u201ca substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Seventh Circuit rejected the government\u2019s theory, finding that, as a result of\u00a0Chambers<\/em>, Narvaez\u2019s sentence violated the Due Process Clause:<\/p>\n

We have recognized that sentencing errors are generally not cognizable on collateral review.\u00a0See Scott v. United States<\/em>, 997 F.2d 340, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1993). Mr. Narvaez\u2019s case, however, does not come within this general rule. \u00a0It presents a special and very narrow exception: A post-conviction change in the law has rendered the sentencing court\u2019s decision unlawful.\u00a0See Welch<\/em>, 604 F.3d at 412\u201313 (recognizing that relief is available \u201cwhere a change in law reduces the defendant\u2019s statutory maximum sentence below the imposed sentence\u201d). In\u00a0Begay<\/em> and\u00a0Chambers<\/em>, the Supreme Court resolved an open question regarding the kinds of crimes that fall within the meaning of \u201cviolent felony\u201d under the ACCA, and, by implication, the career offender guideline.\u00a0See Templeton<\/em>, 543 F.3d at 380. The Court\u2019s pronouncements did not simply constitute an \u201cintervening change in the law\u201d in the traditional sense. Rather, the decisions make clear that, at the time of his sentencing, Mr. Narvaez did not qualify as a career offender under the guidelines. An additional five years of incarceration was imposed upon him without any legal justification. Such gratuitous infliction of punishment is a fundamental defect in the court\u2019s judgment that clearly constitutes a complete miscarriage of justice and a violation of due process. \u00a0(9-11)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The Seventh Circuit\u2019s reasoning here seem quite broad and might open up collateral relief any time any time the Supreme Court adopts a narrowing construction of a guidelines provision. \u00a0There is perhaps a limitation, though, to sentences imposed when the guidelines were mandatory. \u00a0Consider this argument by the government and Seventh Circuit\u2019s response:<\/p>\n

The Government submits, however, that the sentencing court\u2019s error in this case does not warrant \u00a7 2255 relief. Unlike the situation under the ACCA, Mr. Narvaez\u2019s 170- month sentence was actually within the authorized 20-year statutory maximum for his crime. Therefore, the Government reasons that, because Mr. Narvaez would be exposed to the full range of punishment authorized by Congress for his crime at resentencing, and would remain eligible for the identical 170-month sentence under the advisory guidelines, his claim does not present a fundamental defect.<\/p>\n

We cannot accept this argument. The fact that Mr. Narvaez\u2019s sentence falls below the applicable statutory-maximum sentence is not alone determinative of whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred. The sentencing court\u2019s misapplication of the then-mandatory \u00a7 4B1.1 enhancement in Mr. Narvaez\u2019s case was central to its guidelines calculation. Nothing in the record indicates that the court would have sentenced Mr. Narvaez to five additional years of incarceration had the judge not been under the legal misapprehension, shared by the rest of the circuit, that Mr. Narvaez was a career offender and that the corresponding guidelines required such an enhancement. The application of the career offender provision increased the sentencing range for Mr. Narvaez. Speculation that the district court today might impose the same sentence is not enough to overcome the fact that, at the time of his initial sentencing, Mr. Narvaez was sentenced based upon the equivalent of a nonexistent offense. This error clearly constitutes a miscarriage of justice and a due process violation. \u00a0(12-13)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Whether and under what circumstances the retroactivity ruling of\u00a0Narvaez <\/em>would apply to defendants sentenced post-Booker <\/em>thus remains an open question.<\/p>\n

Cross posted at Life Sentences Blog<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Retroactivity has been in the news a lot lately, thanks to the U.S. Sentencing Commission\u2019s\u00a0ongoing consideration of whether to give already-sentenced defendants the benefit of more favorable crack guidelines. But crack defendants are not the only inmates serving extraordinarily long terms based on recently discarded aspects of federal sentencing law. \u00a0Earlier this week, the Seventh […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,28,74,23],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13646","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-criminal-justice","category-criminal-law-process","category-federal-sentencing","category-seventh-circuit","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13646","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13646"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13646\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13646"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13646"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13646"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}