{"id":14532,"date":"2011-08-28T22:20:09","date_gmt":"2011-08-29T03:20:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=14532"},"modified":"2011-08-29T08:11:33","modified_gmt":"2011-08-29T13:11:33","slug":"seventh-circuit-rejects-retroactivity-for-padilla","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2011\/08\/seventh-circuit-rejects-retroactivity-for-padilla\/","title":{"rendered":"Seventh Circuit Rejects Retroactivity for Padilla"},"content":{"rendered":"

In\u00a0Padilla v. Kentucky<\/em>, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform a client of the deportation risks that result from a guilty plea. \u00a0However, the Court did not clearly indicate whether its holding must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, leaving the lower courts to sort out the mess. \u00a0A handful of district courts have already split on this issue. \u00a0Now, with the Seventh Circuit\u2019s ruling last week in\u00a0Chaidez v. United States<\/em>\u00a0(No. 10-3623)<\/a>, the circuits are also split. \u00a0A divided panel in\u00a0Chaidez<\/em>\u00a0rejected both retroactivity and the Third Circuit\u2019s reasoning to the contrary in\u00a0United States v. Orocio<\/em>, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).<\/p>\n

As the\u00a0Chaidez\u00a0<\/em>majority observed, the key legal issue is whether\u00a0Padilla\u00a0<\/em>announced a new rule, or merely provided an application of the established principles of ineffective assistance from\u00a0Strickland v. Washington<\/em>, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). \u00a0Under\u00a0Teague v. Lane<\/em>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a new rule may not be applied retroactively unless it falls into one of two exceptions that plainly do not encompass the\u00a0Padilla\u00a0<\/em>holding.<\/p>\n

Teague\u00a0<\/em>and least some of its progeny suggest what seems effectively a strong presumption in favor of a \u201cnew rule\u201d finding (and hence against retroactivity). \u00a0Here is how the\u00a0Chaidez\u00a0<\/em>majority characterized the law:<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

A rule is said to be new when it was not \u201cdictated<\/em>\u00a0by precedent existing at the time the defendant\u2019s conviction became final.\u201d\u00a0Teague<\/em>, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). . . .\u00a0Thus, the Court has explained that\u00a0Teague<\/em>\u201cvalidates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.\u201d\u00a0Saffle v. Parks<\/em>, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (quoting\u00a0Butler v. McKellar<\/em>, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990)). The pertinent inquiry here is whether\u00a0Padilla<\/em>\u2019s outcome was \u201csusceptible to debate among reasonable minds.\u201d\u00a0Butler<\/em>, 494 U.S. at 415. Put differently, \u201cour task is to determine whether a . . . court considering [Chaidez\u2019s] claim at the time [her] conviction became final\u201d\u2014pre-Padilla<\/em>\u2014\u201cwould have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that [Padilla] was required by the Constitution.\u201d\u00a0Saffle<\/em>, 494 U.S. at 488. \u00a0(7-8)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

With the question framed this way, it is hard to disagree with the majority\u2019s bottom-line conclusion. \u00a0The fact that the lower courts had been overwhelming lined up against the \u00a0Padilla\u00a0<\/em>rule seems almost dispositive of the question \u2014 under those circumstances, how can one conclude that this was not an issue over which reasonable jurists might have differed?<\/p>\n

Writing in dissent, though, Judge Williams argued that the majority\u2019s \u201creasonable jurists\u201d test did not accurately reflect the governing law:<\/p>\n

[T]his narrow conception of the \u201cdictated\u201d language fromTeague<\/em>\u00a0is not the relevant inquiry in the\u00a0Strickland<\/em>\u00a0context. \u201cThe often repeated language that\u00a0Teague<\/em>\u00a0endorses \u2018reasonable, good-faith interpretations\u2019 by state courts is an explanation of policy, not a statement of law.\u201d\u00a0Williams v. Taylor<\/em>, 529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000) (plurality) (quoting\u00a0Butler<\/em>, 494 U.S. at 414). As the Court has stated, and as the majority today recognizes, \u201cthe\u00a0Strickland<\/em>\u00a0test provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,\u201d\u00a0id<\/em>. at 391 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added). \u201c[W]here the starting point is a rule of general application such as\u00a0Strickland<\/em>, \u201cit will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent,\u201d\u00a0Wright v. West<\/em>, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). (23)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Judge Williams did not see\u00a0Padilla<\/em>\u00a0as one of those \u201cinfrequent cases\u201d referred to by Justice Kennedy, but rather as a straightforward application of\u00a0Strickland<\/em>:<\/p>\n

The analytical mechanism by which the Court applied\u00a0Strickland<\/em>\u00a0does not detract from the fact that\u00a0Strickland<\/em>\u00a0is the general test governing ineffective assistance claims, and that the\u00a0Padilla<\/em>\u00a0Court did no more than recognize that removal is the type of consequence that a defendant needs to be informed of when making the decision of whether to plea. \u00a0(24)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The clash between majority and dissent in\u00a0Chaidez\u00a0<\/em>highlights what is so analytically unsatisfactory about the\u00a0\u201dnew rule\u201d test of\u00a0Teague<\/em>. \u00a0Because every case presents a fact pattern that is in some respects unique, every holding can in some sense be thought of as articulating a new rule. \u00a0But because every case also purports to rely on established legal principles, every case can also be thought of as mere application. \u00a0Rather than an either-or question, the \u201cnewness\u201d question is really one of degree, and it is not clear how and where to draw a line on the spectrum for purposes of retroactivity.<\/p>\n

Given the emerging split in the lower courts,\u00a0Chaidez\u00a0<\/em>might be a good case for Supreme Court review. \u00a0And, if the Court does take the case, I hope the Court will use it as an occasion to revisit the wisdom of\u00a0Teague\u00a0<\/em>itself. \u00a0I appreciate that\u00a0Teague\u00a0<\/em>was intended to preserve the finality of state judgments by making it harder for state defendants to take advantage of favorable new Supreme Court decisions in federal habeas proceedings. \u00a0But, since\u00a0Teague<\/em>, Congress has erected a host of new barriers to habeas relief that accomplish the same end, e.g., the one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions, restrictions on second and successive habeas petitions, and the \u201cclearly established law\u201d requirement of 28 U.S.C.\u00a0\u00a7 2254(d)(1). \u00a0Add to that the forfeiture and procedural bar doctrines, which predated\u00a0Teague<\/em>, and there is a formidable obstacle course for habeas petitioners to traverse before they are able to take advantage of new Supreme Court decisions. \u00a0Teague\u00a0<\/em>is an unnecessary overlay that complicates habeas litigation to no good effect.<\/p>\n

To make this a little more concrete, Chaidez received the fateful counsel from her lawyer in 2003. \u00a0There was nothing that happened between 2003 and 2010, when\u00a0Padilla\u00a0<\/em>was decided, that transformed what might have been good advice into bad advice \u2014 her legal representation fell below professional norms in 2003 as much as it would have in 2010. \u00a0The question we should be asking is not the unanswerable question of whether\u00a0Padilla\u00a0<\/em>announced a new rule, but the question of whether Chaidez was so prejudiced by the bad counsel she received that she should be given an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea.<\/p>\n

Cross posted at Life Sentences Blog<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In\u00a0Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform a client of the deportation risks that result from a guilty plea. \u00a0However, the Court did not clearly indicate whether its holding must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, 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