{"id":20384,"date":"2013-06-18T09:41:13","date_gmt":"2013-06-18T14:41:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=20384"},"modified":"2013-06-18T09:41:13","modified_gmt":"2013-06-18T14:41:13","slug":"so-long-harris-breyers-on-board","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2013\/06\/so-long-harris-breyers-on-board\/","title":{"rendered":"So Long, Harris \u2014 Breyer\u2019s on Board"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yesterday, in a long-anticipated move, the Supreme Court finally overturned its 2002 decision in Harris v. United States<\/em>. The new decision in Alleyne v. United States <\/em>extended jury-trial rights to mandatory minimum sentences. Justice Breyer\u2019s \u201cflip\u201d from his position in Harris <\/em>made the difference.<\/p>\n

In Apprendi v. New Jersey <\/em>(2000), the Court held that a defendant has a right to a jury trial regarding the facts that may increase the maximum <\/em>sentence to which he is exposed. Breyer dissented in Apprendi <\/em>and has steadfastly maintained ever since that Apprendi <\/em>was wrongly decided.<\/p>\n

Two years later, in Harris<\/em>, the Court decided not to extend Apprendi <\/em>to the facts that raise a defendant\u2019s minimum <\/em>sentence. Breyer was part of the 5-4 majority in Harris<\/em>, but stated in a concurring opinion that he could see no reason to distinguish increasing the maximum from increasing the minimum. Thus, Breyer\u2019s vote in Harris <\/em>was simply another vote against Apprendi<\/em>. This immediately raised the expectation that some day, when Breyer was ready to give up the fight against Apprendi<\/em>, he would be willing to overturn Harris.<\/em><\/p>\n

Some day has come.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

In Alleyne<\/em>, Breyer provided the crucial fifth vote to overturn Harris<\/em>. In a short concurring opinion, Breyer reiterated his view that Apprendi <\/em>was in error, but stated, \u201cApprendi <\/em>has now defined the relevant legal regime for an additional decade [since Harris<\/em>]. And, in my view, the law should no longer tolerate the anomaly that the Apprendi<\/em>\/Harris <\/em>distinction creates.\u201d<\/p>\n

I don\u2019t see much of particular interest in Justice Thomas\u2019s majority opinion; Thomas authored the dissent in Harris<\/em>, which he has now been able to rewrite as an opinion for the winning side.<\/p>\n

Justice Sotomayor\u2019s concurring opinion was more notable for its effort to reconcile overturning Harris <\/em>with the doctrine of stare decisis<\/em>. (Thomas has never had much use for stare decisis<\/em>, so he predictably gave short shrift to the doctrine in his opinion.) Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, affirmed that overturning precedent requires a \u201cspecial justification.\u201d Here, though, such a special justification was present:<\/p>\n

As an initial matter, when procedural rules are at issue that do not govern primary conduct and do not implicate the reliance interests of private parties, the force of stare decisis<\/em> is reduced. See United States v. Gaudin<\/em>, 515 U. S. 506, 521 (1995); Payne<\/em>, 501 U. S., at 828. And any reliance interest that the Federal Government and state governments might have is particularly minimal here because prosecutors are perfectly able to \u201ccharge facts upon which a mandatory minimum sentence is based in the indictment and prove them to a jury.\u201d Harris<\/em>, 536 U. S., at 581 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Indeed, even with Harris<\/em> in place, prosecutors already sometimes charge such facts and seek to prove them to a jury. . . .<\/p>\n

In this context, stare decisis<\/em> does not compel adherence to a decision whose \u201cunderpinnings\u201d have been \u201ceroded\u201d by subsequent developments of constitutional law. Gaudin<\/em>, 515 U. S., at 521. In rejecting a constitutional challenge to a state statute that increased a defendant\u2019s minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding, McMillan<\/em> relied on a distinction between \u201celements\u201d and \u201csentencing factors.\u201d477 U. S., at 86. That distinction was undermined by Apprendi<\/em>, where we held that a legislature may not \u201cremove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.\u201d 530 U. S., at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n

In Harris<\/em>, we squarely confronted the question whether \u201cMcMillan<\/em> stands after Apprendi<\/em>.\u201d 536 U. S., at 550. Five Members of the Court recognized that the cases were in fact incompatible. See id<\/em>., at 569 (BREYER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id<\/em>., at 572, 583 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (\u201c[O]nly a minority of the Court embrac[es] the distinction between McMillan<\/em> and Apprendi<\/em> that forms the basis of today\u2019s holding\u201d). . . .<\/p>\n

We have said that a decision may be \u201cof questionable precedential value\u201d when \u201ca majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of [a] plurality.\u201d Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida<\/em>, 517 U. S. 44, 66 (1996). And Harris<\/em> has stood on especially weak ground because its vitality depended upon the possibility that the Court might retreat from Apprendi<\/em>. See Harris<\/em>, 536 U. S., at 569\u2013570 (opinion of BREYER, J.). That has not happened. Instead, while individual Members of this Court have continued to question Apprendi, see<\/em> post, at 1\u20132 (opinion of BREYER, J.); post, at 1\u20132 (ALITO, J., dissenting), its rule has become even more firmly rooted in the Court\u2019s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the decade since Harris<\/em>. . . .<\/p>\n

As a result of these decisions, Harris<\/em> has become even more of an outlier. For that reason, I agree that it is appropriate for the Court to \u201coverrule Harris<\/em> and to apply Apprendi\u2019<\/em>s basic jury-determination rule to mandatory minimum sentences\u201d in order to \u201cerase th[is] anomaly\u201d in our case law. Post, at 2\u20133 (opinion of BREYER, J.). I do not suggest that every single factor that supports the overruling of precedent is present here. Post, at 3, n. * (ALITO, J., dissenting). But particularly in a case where the reliance interests are so minimal, and the reliance interests of private parties are nonexistent, stare decisis<\/em> cannot excuse a refusal to bring \u201ccoherence and consistency,\u201d Patterson<\/em>, 491 U. S., at 174, to our Sixth Amendment law.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Sotomayor thus suggests a lesser deference to precedent in cases presenting procedural questions, particularly when the precedent lacked majority agreement on the reasoning. Expect this opinion to be invoked in any number of crim pro cases in the next few terms, especially since Sotomayor\u2019s reasoning was partially, if summarily, echoed in footnote 5 in the majority opinion.<\/p>\n

<\/em>Whatever the significance of its discussion of stare decisis<\/em>, Alleyene <\/em>may prove the most practically important decision in the Apprendi <\/em>line of cases since Blakely v. Washington<\/em> (2004), which resulted in fundamental changes to many sentencing guidelines systems. Mandatory minimums are a routine aspect of criminal-law practice in many jurisdictions, including the federal system, often providing prosecutors with a powerful source of leverage in plea negotiations. Alleyne<\/em> now reduces that leverage by making it procedurally more onerous for prosecutors to have mandatory minimums applied. How much more onerous will vary a great deal from case to case; in many, the loss of leverage will be insignificant, but in some it may be decisive. Although Alleyne <\/em>is not likely to result in a large increase in the number of jury trials, it may perceptibly alter the prosecutor-defendant balance of power in plea negotiations in certain kinds of cases in some jurisdictions.<\/p>\n

Alleyne\u2019s<\/em> impact, however, will be substantially constrained by another \u201canomaly\u201d (to use Breyer\u2019s term) in the Apprendi <\/em>line of cases: the Apprendi <\/em>jury-trial right does not apply to sentence enhancements based on prior criminal convictions. The leading case is Almendarez-Torres v. United States<\/em> (1998). Since many of the most important mandatory minimums \u2014 think, for instance, of \u201cthree strikes\u201d laws \u2014 are triggered by criminal history, the Almendarez-Torres <\/em>exception actually constitutes a huge gap in Alleyne<\/em>\u2018s coverage.<\/p>\n

Might Almendarez-Torres <\/em>be in jeopardy now? Alleyne <\/em>should inspire defense counsel to redouble their efforts to have A-T <\/em>overturned. After all, the decision is of about the same vintage as Harris <\/em>and seems no less anomalous relative to the Apprendi <\/em>line of cases. Bearing in mind Sotomayor\u2019s point about the diminished force of stare decisis <\/em>in procedural cases, the Court should be open to revisiting A-T<\/em> now. Notably, Breyer\u2019s vote in A-T <\/em>was necessary for the 5-4 majority, just as it had been in Harris<\/em>. If Breyer really has made his peace with Apprendi <\/em>and is now committed to eliminating doctrinal anomalies in this area, A-T <\/em>may not long stand.<\/p>\n

Cross posted at Life Sentences<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yesterday, in a long-anticipated move, the Supreme Court finally overturned its 2002 decision in Harris v. United States. The new decision in Alleyne v. United States extended jury-trial rights to mandatory minimum sentences. Justice Breyer\u2019s \u201cflip\u201d from his position in Harris made the difference. In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), the Court held that a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,28,74,122,24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20384","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-criminal-justice","category-criminal-law-process","category-federal-sentencing","category-public","category-us-supreme-court","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20384","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20384"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20384\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20384"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20384"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20384"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}