{"id":22874,"date":"2014-07-03T07:42:16","date_gmt":"2014-07-03T12:42:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=22874"},"modified":"2014-06-30T13:44:25","modified_gmt":"2014-06-30T18:44:25","slug":"us-supreme-court-review-constitutional-criminal-cases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2014\/07\/us-supreme-court-review-constitutional-criminal-cases\/","title":{"rendered":"US Supreme Court Review: Constitutional Criminal Cases"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/06\/ussc-ot-2013-logo-tn.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft size-full wp-image-22822\" src=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/06\/ussc-ot-2013-logo-tn.jpg\" alt=\"US Supreme Court logo\" width=\"200\" height=\"154\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>(<em>This is another post in our series,\u00a0<a style=\"color: #003366;\" href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?s=%22US+Supreme+Court+Review%22\">Looking Back at the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s 2013 Term<\/a>.<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p>In my\u00a0<a style=\"color: #0066cc;\" href=\"http:\/\/www.lifesentencesblog.com\/?p=7121\">previous post<\/a>, I discussed the Court\u2019s recent Fourth Amendment decisions. \u00a0Here are this term\u2019s other criminal cases that also center on constitutional issues (excluding habeas decisions):<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>Kansas v. Cheever<\/em>, 571 U.S. __ (2013) (prosecutors could use testimony based on court-ordered mental examination of defendant in order to rebut defendant\u2019s intoxication defense).<\/li>\n<li><em>Hall v. Florida<\/em>, 572 U.S. __ (2014) (in capital case, state may not categorically limit intellectual disability defense to individuals with an IQ score of 70 or lower \u2014 see my earlier post<a style=\"color: #0066cc;\" href=\"http:\/\/www.lifesentencesblog.com\/?p=7025\">\u00a0here<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><em>Kaley v. United States<\/em>, 571 U.S. __ (2014) (when trying to overturn pretrial asset freeze affecting funds to be used for legal representation, defendant may not challenge grand jury\u2019s probable cause determination).<\/li>\n<li><em>Martinez v. Illinois<\/em>, 572 U.S. __ (2014) (after jury empaneled and sworn, judge\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion for \u201cdirected findings of not guilty\u201d counted as acquittal for double jeopardy purposes and precluded appeal by state).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A notable recurring theme across this set of decisions is the Court\u2019s desire to maintain a particular competitive balance at criminal trials.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>For instance, in\u00a0<em>Cheever<\/em>, the defendant introduced expert evidence in support of an intoxication defense. \u00a0The question was whether the state could offer rebuttal testimony from an expert who performed a court-ordered mental examination of the defendant. \u00a0Since the defendant had not consented to this examination, its use at trial arguably implicated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. \u00a0However, a unanimous Supreme Court had little difficulty rejecting this argument, observing simply, \u201cWhen a defendant presents evidence through a psychological expert who has examined him, the government likewise is permitted to use the only effective means of challenging that evidence: testimony from an expert who has also examined him.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This kind of sensibility can work in favor of defendants, too. \u00a0In\u00a0<em>Martinez<\/em>, the Court had little patience for the state\u2019s argument that it would suffer some unfairness if further prosecution of the defendant were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause:<\/p>\n<blockquote style=\"color: #777777;\"><p>\u00a0On the day of trial, the court was acutely\u00a0aware of the significance of swearing a jury. It repeatedly delayed that act to give the State additional time to find\u00a0its witnesses. It had previously granted the State a num\u00adber of continuances for the same purpose.\u00a0<em>See supra<\/em>, at 2. And, critically, the court told the State on the day of trial that it could \u201cmove to dismiss [its] case\u201d before the jury was sworn. Tr. 3. Had the State accepted that invitation,\u00a0the Double Jeopardy Clause would not have barred it from\u00a0recharging Martinez. Instead, the State participated in\u00a0the selection of jurors and did not ask for dismissal before\u00a0the jury was sworn. When the State declined to dismiss\u00a0its case, it \u201c\u2018took a chance[,] . . . enter[ing] upon the trial of\u00a0the case without sufficient evidence to convict.\u2019\u201d<em>\u00a0Downum\u00a0<\/em><em>v. United States<\/em>, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963). Here, the\u00a0State knew, or should have known, that an acquittal\u00a0forever bars the retrial of the defendant when it occurs\u00a0after jeopardy has attached.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>No unfairness here, state, you knowingly took a chance on going to trial, and you lost \u2014 don\u2019t expect us to bail you out now. \u00a0Just as Cheever had to live with the consequences of proceeding with his intoxication defense, so the state in\u00a0<em>Martinez\u00a0<\/em>had to live with the consequences of proceeding to trial without all of its witnesses.<\/p>\n<p><em>Kaley\u00a0<\/em>was a complicated, and much more closely contested, decision, but a key consideration also seems to have been a desire to maintain the established competitive balance between prosecution and defense. \u00a0The defendants sought a pretrial hearing to relitigate the grand jury\u2019s probable cause determination; their purpose was to regain access to funds they intended to use to pay for legal representation. The Court refused, noting the potential effect on the government\u2019s ability to present its case most effectively at trial:<\/p>\n<blockquote style=\"color: #777777;\"><p>To ensure a favorable result at the [probable cause] hearing, the Government could choose to disclose all its witnesses and other evidence. \u00a0But that would give the defendant knowledge of the Government\u2019s case and strategy well before the rules of criminal procedure\u2014or principles of due process,\u00a0<em>see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland<\/em>, 373 U. S. 83 (1963)\u2014would otherwise require.\u00a0<em>See<\/em>\u00a0Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 26.2(a), 16(a)(2);\u00a0<em>Weatherford v. Bursey<\/em>, 429 U. S. 545, 559\u2013561 (1977) (\u201cThere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case\u201d). And sometimes (particularly in organized\u00a0crime and drug trafficking prosecutions, in which forfeiture questions often arise), that sneak preview might not just aid the defendant\u2019s preparations but also facilitate\u00a0witness tampering or jeopardize witness safety.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><em>Kaley<\/em>\u00a0not only provides a further illustration of the Court\u2019s desire to maintain the competitive balance at criminal trials, but also demonstrates that the Court\u2019s efforts in this area often have a certain artificiality and arbitrariness to them. \u00a0After all, our conventional understandings of what constitutes a fair balance between prosecution and defense come not from Holy Writ, but from the Court\u2019s own prior decisions. \u00a0The metaphor of a \u201clevel playing field\u201d is just that \u2014 a metaphor. \u00a0There are no tools available to measure the fairness of a trial in the sort of precise, objective way that we might measure the flatness of, say, a soccer pitch.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, in\u00a0<em>Kaley<\/em>, the Court relies, in part, on the weakness of the prosecution\u2019s constitutional obligations to turn over evidence to the defense. \u00a0But that weakness is itself only a product of the Court\u2019s own prior decisions in\u00a0<em>Brady v. Maryland\u00a0<\/em>and its progeny \u2014 a line of cases that is hardly uncontroversial or self-evidently correct.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, the Court in\u00a0<em>Kaley<\/em>\u00a0downplays the value of retaining a lawyer of one\u2019s own choice; the Court\u2019s decision will have the effect of relegating some defendants to court-appointed counsel who otherwise might have been able to pay for their own lawyers. \u00a0Why, one might wonder, is it more important to the fairness of a trial to allow the government to hide its cards for as long as possible than it is to allow the defendant to hire a lawyer he knows and trusts? \u00a0The Court has no real answer to this challenge but to point to its own earlier decisions that had already circumscribed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in cases subject to federal forfeiture statutes. \u00a0Again, we find ourselves less on a level playing field than on something akin to an obstacle course full of unexpected pitfalls.<\/p>\n<p>It is possible that the unique pitfalls facing each side do roughly balance out \u2014 and the double jeopardy pitfall highlighted by\u00a0<em>Martinez\u00a0<\/em>is a very significant one facing prosecutors \u2014 but we can never really know whether this is true or have confidence that any given criminal procedure decision enhances or diminishes the overall evenness of the contest.<\/p>\n<p>Cross posted at Life Sentences Blog.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>(This is another post in our series,\u00a0Looking Back at the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s 2013 Term.) In my\u00a0previous post, I discussed the Court\u2019s recent Fourth Amendment decisions. \u00a0Here are this term\u2019s other criminal cases that also center on constitutional issues (excluding habeas decisions): Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. __ (2013) (prosecutors could use testimony based on [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[126,30,68,122,24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22874","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constitutional-law","category-criminal-justice","category-judges-judicial-process","category-public","category-us-supreme-court","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22874","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22874"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22874\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22874"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22874"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22874"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}