During the meetings, it quickly became apparent that some media outlets in the West haven\u2019t accurately characterized current Japanese policy. Tokyo\u2019s longstanding position has been that there’s \u201cno dispute\u201d over the Senkakus\u2014the territory belongs to Japan and there is nothing to negotiate or even talk about. This view is of course controversial in\u00a0China, which also claims the Islands, and the two sides have been engaged in a fairly protracted and tense standoff as a result. To reduce tensions and improve bilateral relations, China and Japan jointly released a four-point statement on November 7th.\u00a0Sources\u00a0ranging from\u00a0The Diplomat<\/em><\/a>\u00a0to\u00a0The New York Times<\/em><\/a>\u00a0<\/em>reported the statement as evidence of a significant shift in policy: Japan would now\u00a0recognize the existence of a dispute. On\u00a0this view, the recent statement was\u00a0a major concession to China because recognizing a dispute might open the door to bilateral negotiations that could have only one effect\u2014namely, an erosion of Japan\u2019s effective control over the territory.<\/p>\n But these media accounts are simply\u00a0inaccurate<\/em>. Japan has not changed its policy; every official who addressed the issue stated unequivocally that Tokyo continues to maintain that there is no dispute.<\/p>\n The principal source of confusion is that China and Japan both released their own versions of the four-point statement\u2014one each in their respective native languages, and one each in English. In relevant part, China\u2019s English-language version states that \u201cthe two sides have acknowledged that different positions exist between them regarding the tensions which have emerged in recent years over the Diaoyu Islands and some waters in the East China Sea, and agreed to prevent the situation from aggravating through dialogue and consultation and establish crisis management mechanisms to avoid contingencies.\u201d Japan\u2019s English-language version, by contrast, states that both sides \u201crecognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands, and shared the view that, through dialogue and consultation, they would prevent the deterioration of the situation, establish a crisis management mechanism and avert the rise of unforeseen circumstances.\u201d While similar in various respects, these texts carry different meanings on significant issues. Most importantly, China\u2019s version suggests that the two sides acknowledge that they hold different positions not only regarding\u00a0tensions in the waters surrounding the Islands, but also over the Islands themselves. It doesn’t take much to go\u00a0from there to the conclusion that Japan now recognizes a dispute.<\/p>\n How, then, to make sense of the recent statement in light of the longstanding and\u2014it turns out\u2014current Japanese position that there is no dispute? First, disregard the Chinese versions of the statement\u2014Tokyo did not approve them, so they cannot bind Japan or operate as official representations of the Japanese position. They are merely what China wants to tell Chinese nationals and the international community about Japan\u2019s position. Second, pay close attention to what Tokyo said. It is noteworthy that the Japanese versions never state that Japan recognizes a dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Instead, they express simply that the two sides \u201crecognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands.\u201d The different views, in other words, do not concern the Islands themselves, but the waters that surround them, and do not concern sovereignty per se, but rather the \u201cemergence of tense situations in recent years.\u201d<\/p>\n What, specifically, are the different views to which Japan refers? I asked this question to an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who explained that they consist of the Chinese view that tense situations exist because Japan purchased the Senkaku Islands in 2012, and the competing Japanese view that these situations exist\u00a0because China has set up an Air Defense Identification Zone that encompasses the airspace above the Islands and sent scores of vessels into the surrounding waters. Strictly speaking, recognition of disagreement on these points\u00a0is independent of whether Japan recognizes a dispute over sovereignty, so the longstanding policy continues.<\/p>\n Coordination Presents a Challenge<\/strong><\/p>\n From my meetings with various government officials it was also clear that Japan\u2019s greatest concern involves a so-called \u201cgray zone\u201d incident\u2014a seizure of the Senkaku Islands by paramilitary Chinese fishermen or other ambiguous actors. From the Japanese perspective, such an incident would require difficult decisions about whether and when to shift from a police response to one that involves the military. Leaving the matter to the Coast Guard, which has close to no weapons, creates a risk that Japan will be unable to extricate potentially well-armed intruders, but handing the matter over to the Self-Defense Force creates a risk of involving the People\u2019s Liberation Army and starting a war.<\/p>\n At the moment, there are reasons both to discount and credit these fears. On one hand, while the number of Chinese incursions into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands has been significant in recent years, it has declined. The chart below* reports the number of incursions by Chinese vessels into the waters around the Senkakus in 2013 and most of 2014. Note the red bars, which depict the number of vessels that entered territorial waters ranging from 0 to 12 nautical miles from the Islands\u2019 coast. The downward trend shows that China is not sending as many vessels into the most hotly contested area, and with recent signs of a d\u00e9tente there is reason to think that a sharp uptick is unlikely in the near future. Insofar as these developments signal a Chinese desire to avoid conflict, the risk of a gray-zone incursion seems limited, at least for now. Of course, the blue line does not trend downward to the same degree, but it is a less significant measure of the risk of conflict because it represents vessel entries into the contiguous zone (12 to 24 nautical miles from the coast), which are not as provocative.<\/p>\n
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