{"id":28559,"date":"2019-07-25T08:40:08","date_gmt":"2019-07-25T13:40:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=28559"},"modified":"2019-07-25T08:40:08","modified_gmt":"2019-07-25T13:40:08","slug":"stare-decisis-and-fractured-majorities","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2019\/07\/stare-decisis-and-fractured-majorities\/","title":{"rendered":"Stare Decisis and Fractured Majorities"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"The[The following is a guest post from Daniel Suhr ’08, a prior guest alumni contributor to the Blog.<\/em>]<\/p>\n

On June 25th the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down its decision in Koschkee v. Evers<\/em><\/a>, 2019 WI 76, which is in many ways a rerun of questions raised in Coyne v. Walker<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0 2016 WI 38.\u00a0 Coyne<\/em> was, to put it mildly, a jurisprudential mess: \u201cOur mandate resulted from a one-justice lead opinion, a two-justice concurrence, and a one-justice concurrence, all of which agreed only on the outcome of the case\u201d (Koschkee<\/em>, \u00b6 5), plus a principal dissent representing the views of three justices, and a secondary dissent representing the views of only two justices.<\/p>\n

Chief Justice Roggensack\u2019s Koschkee<\/em> majority (which commanded four votes on everything except \u00b6 17) briefly discussed the stare decisis<\/em> weight of Coyne<\/em> in an early footnote, stating, \u201cWhen we are asked to overturn one of our prior decisions, lead opinions that have no common legal rationale with their concurrences are troublesome.\u201d (\u00b6 8, n.5.)\u00a0 They are troublesome, the Court continues, because it is hard to run their rationale through the traditional stare decisis<\/em> analysis when there is no definitive rationale to analyze.<\/p>\n

Justice Bradley\u2019s dissent, by contrast, says the majority \u201cthrows the doctrine of stare decisis<\/em> out the window.\u201d (\u00b6 62.) To the Court\u2019s argument from the lack of a common rationale in Coyne<\/em>, she replies, \u201c[T]he split nature of the Coyne<\/em> opinion is of no import. The mandate of Coyne<\/em> was clear despite the fractured nature of the opinions. Although the four justices in the majority subscribed to differing rationales, they agreed on the essential conclusion\u2026.\u201d (\u00b6 73.)<\/p>\n

In my view, the Chief Justice has the better of the argument.\u00a0 It is blackletter law that when a court fails to achieve a majority opinion for the rationale in a case, the narrowest construction given by a member of the majority supporting the outcome or mandate controls. Panetti v. Quarterman<\/em>, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (\u201cWhen there is no majority opinion, the narrower holding [of the concurrence] controls,\u201d citing Marks v. United States<\/em>, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).<\/p>\n

Though that statement has great implications for vertical stare decisis<\/em> (the obligation of lower courts to follow rules of law handed down by higher courts), it tells us nothing about horizontal stare decisis<\/em>, or the obligation of later-in-time members of the same court to follow that case.<\/p>\n

However, it is generally accepted law (if not quite blackletter law) that \u201cif a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis<\/em> effect.\u201d 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts \u00a7 159 (1995). See<\/em> 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review \u00a7 602 (1995) (\u201c[P]lurality decisions of a state supreme court, in which no majority agrees to the reasoning, are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis<\/em>; if a majority merely agrees to a particular result, without agreeing as to the grounds for a decision, the parties are bound by the decision but the case provides no binding authority beyond the immediate parties. Such decisions do not overrule prior or inconsistent decisions, and are not authority on any point concurred in by less than a majority.\u201d). Accord J.A.S. v. Bushelman<\/em>, 342 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Ky. 2011); Rowland v. Washtenaw Cty. Rd. Comm’n<\/em>, 731 N.W.2d 41, 47 (Mich. 2007); In re Adoption of Erin G.,<\/em> 140 P.3d 886, 890 (Alaska 2006); Mercury Indem. Co. v. Kim<\/em>, 830 N.E.2d 603, 612 n.3 (Ill. App. 2005); Robinson v. Century Pers<\/em>., 678 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Chadwick v. Pub. Serv. Co.,<\/em> 731 P.2d 968, 970 (N.M. App. 1986).\u00a0 See <\/em>Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions, A Study in Stare Decisis<\/em>, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev.<\/span> 99 (1956) (citing, inter alia<\/em>, Chief Justice John Marshall in New York v. Miln,<\/em> 8 Pet. (U.S.) 118, 121 (1834)).<\/p>\n

This makes sense as a matter of horizontal stare decisis<\/em>. Later-in-time justices are not absolutely bound by even the majority opinions of their predecessors.\u00a0 How much less so the authority of various opinions that all are in a majority for the mandate but disagree on a rationale.\u00a0 Coyne <\/em>is actually a good example of where the rationale set forth in the principal dissent commanded the support of more justices than any of the opinions in the majority.<\/p>\n

If the Court really wants to deal seriously with the weight of its opinions, it should end the canard of a \u201clead\u201d opinion drawn by random lot, and instead place first the opinion which commands the most votes. Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes<\/em>, 100 Marq. L. Rev.<\/span> 969, 992 (2017) (citing Joseph D. Kearney, The Wisconsin Supreme Court, Can We Help?<\/em>, Marq. Law.<\/span>, at 48 (Fall 2015)).\u00a0 It should adopt the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s style of specifying the \u201copinion of the Court\u201d at the top and demarcating when justices drop off from particular sections, such that there is no need for concurrences such as Justice Kelly\u2019s today (which consisted of a single sentence disclaiming any agreement with a single paragraph of the majority).\u00a0 And in cases where no opinion commands a majority, like Coyne<\/em>, lower courts should follow the rule of Marks<\/em>, and later-in-time justices should only take the previous opinions for their persuasive value.<\/p>\n

[Daniel Suhr is co-author of the recently published The Past and the Present: Stare Decisis in Wisconsin Law<\/em>, 102 Marq. L. Rev.<\/span> 839 (2019) (with Kevin LeRoy). He is also an attorney with a public-interest law firm and a senior adviser to the campaign of Justice Daniel Kelly, though he did not write this post in either of those capacities.]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[The following is a guest post from Daniel Suhr ’08, a prior guest alumni contributor to the Blog.] On June 25th the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down its decision in Koschkee v. Evers, 2019 WI 76, which is in many ways a rerun of questions raised in Coyne v. Walker,\u00a0 2016 WI 38.\u00a0 Coyne was, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":37,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[351,68,122,3,75],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-28559","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-alumni-contributor","category-judges-judicial-process","category-public","category-wisconsin","category-wisconsin-supreme-court","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28559","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/37"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28559"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28559\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28561,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28559\/revisions\/28561"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28559"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28559"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28559"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}