{"id":29371,"date":"2020-08-30T13:51:44","date_gmt":"2020-08-30T18:51:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=29371"},"modified":"2020-09-14T14:11:04","modified_gmt":"2020-09-14T19:11:04","slug":"enthusiasm-for-voting-in-wisconsin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2020\/08\/enthusiasm-for-voting-in-wisconsin\/","title":{"rendered":"Enthusiasm for voting in Wisconsin"},"content":{"rendered":"

Here is a review of Marquette Law School polling from August 2019 to August 2020 in Wisconsin. All polls are state-wide samples of registered voters, with about 800 respondents per poll (1000 in Feb.) and a margin of error of about +\/- 4 percentage points. Details of each survey and full methodology statement are available at https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/poll\/category\/results-and-data\/<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

There is very little difference in enthusiasm between Biden and Trump voters. Those who strongly approval of Trump\u2019s handling of his job as president are a bit more \u201cvery enthusiastic\u201d (about 8 points) than are those who strongly disapprove. Democrats are a a little more likely to say they are \u201cvery enthusiastic\u201d than are Republicans, by about 5 points.<\/p>\n

These results fluctuate modestly over time.<\/p>\n

There is little evidence to support a clear enthusiasm advantage for either party.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Enthusiasm over time<\/h2>\n

I measure enthusiasm for voting in the November election, not for the particular candidate. I focus on those who say they are \u201cvery enthusiastic\u201d to vote as the definition of enthusiasm.<\/p>\n

The question wording is \u201cHow enthusiastic are you about voting in this November\u2019s elections? Would you say you are very, somewhat, not too, or not at all enthusiastic?\u201d This question has been asked in all MULawPoll surveys conducted since January 2020.<\/p>\n

Enthusiasm was quite high in January and February but dropped off in March and declined further in May. This may be due to the distracion of the coronavirus epidemic or because the primary season drove up enthusiasm which then declined post-primary. Enthusiasm grew in August but has not reached the high levels of January or February.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by poll, Jan.\u00a02020-Aug.\u00a02020<\/caption>\n
Poll Dates<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\nn<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\n70<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n800<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\n73<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n1000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\n67<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n813<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\n58<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n811<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\n59<\/td>\n26<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n805<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\n62<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n801<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Enthusiasm by presidential vote choice<\/h2>\n

Enthusiasm by presidential vote choice combining all 2020 polls finds no difference in enthusiasm for voting by candidate choice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by vote choice, Jan.\u00a02020-Aug.\u00a02020<\/caption>\n
Vote choice<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\nn<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Joe Biden<\/td>\n69<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n2398<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Donald Trump<\/td>\n68<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n2204<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Looking at monthly variation in enthusiasm shows that enthusiasm is equal for supporters of both candidates, and declined equally in March and May from the high levels of January and February. June showed a small Biden advantage and August a small Trump advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by vote choice, January-August 2020<\/caption>\n
Poll dates<\/th>\nVote choice<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n72<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n73<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n76<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n74<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n69<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n69<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n64<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n63<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n68<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n59<\/td>\n30<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nJoe Biden<\/td>\n65<\/td>\n19<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nDonald Trump<\/td>\n68<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Enthusiasm by approval of Trump as president<\/h2>\n

Enthusiasm varies between those who approve strongly or only somewhat of the job Trump is doing as president, and similalry between those who disapprove strongly or somewhat.<\/p>\n

Those who only somewhat approve or somewhat disapprove are markedly less enthusiastic about voting than those who strongly approve or strongly disapprove. A significant number of voters \u201csomewhat approve\u201d of Trump\u2019s handling of his job, about twice as many as \u201csomewhat disapprove.\u201d Lower enthusiasm among this \u201csomewhat approve\u201d group could be a risk for Trump\u2019s efforts to mobilize all his potential voters.<\/p>\n

Among those with strong opinions of Trump\u2019s performance as president, there is a small enthusiasm advantage among those who strongly approve over those who strongly disapprove, a potential weakness for the opposition to Trump.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by Trump approval, Jan.\u00a02020-Aug.\u00a02020<\/caption>\n
Trump approval<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\nn<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Strongly approve<\/td>\n80<\/td>\n16<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n1621<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Somewhat approve<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n42<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n730<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Somewhat disapprove<\/td>\n38<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n335<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Strongly disapprove<\/td>\n72<\/td>\n17<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n2172<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Over the winter and spring of 2020 there has been variation in the enthusiasm gap between those who strongly approve of Trump and those who strongly disapprove. The gap was larger in January and especially in May, but was smaller in February and March.<\/p>\n

This variation, and the combined data for all 2020 polls, supports the conclusion that Trump\u2019s strongest supporters are a bit, by six percentage points or so, more enthusiastic about voting than are his strongest detractors, though this has varied modestly over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by Trump approval by wave, January-August, 2020<\/caption>\n
Poll dates<\/th>\nTrump approval<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n85<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n51<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n76<\/td>\n19<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n84<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n38<\/td>\n43<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n49<\/td>\n33<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n80<\/td>\n14<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n77<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n36<\/td>\n38<\/td>\n14<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n48<\/td>\n29<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n74<\/td>\n15<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n78<\/td>\n17<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n26<\/td>\n46<\/td>\n23<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n26<\/td>\n45<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n67<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n70<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n35<\/td>\n45<\/td>\n14<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n34<\/td>\n34<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n67<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nStrongly approve<\/td>\n82<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat approve<\/td>\n34<\/td>\n42<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nSomewhat disapprove<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n33<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n26<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nStrongly disapprove<\/td>\n67<\/td>\n16<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Enthusiasm by party identification<\/h2>\n

Enthusiasm varies across partisanship by strength of identification and by direction of party attachment.<\/p>\n

The strongest partisans are the most enthusiastic, with Democrats holding a slight edge over Republicans. Enthusiasm drops as we move to independents who lean to a party and drops again for independents with no partisan lean. Those who lean Republican are slightly more enthusiastic than those who lean Democratic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by party identification, Jan.-Aug.\u00a02020<\/caption>\n
Party ID<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\nn<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Rep<\/td>\n69<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n1492<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lean Rep<\/td>\n61<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n785<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ind<\/td>\n45<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n16<\/td>\n429<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Lean Dem<\/td>\n60<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n809<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Dem<\/td>\n74<\/td>\n19<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n1438<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

<\/p>\n

The net partisan edge, combining independents who lean to a party with full partisans is small.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by party identification (including leaners as partisans), Jan.\u00a02020-Aug.\u00a02020<\/caption>\n
Party w\/leaners<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\nn<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Republican<\/td>\n66<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n2277<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Independent<\/td>\n45<\/td>\n25<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n16<\/td>\n429<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Democrat<\/td>\n69<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n2248<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Variation in enthusiasm by party from January through August has been modest. There is little evidence of either party having an advantage on enthusiasm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Enthusiasm by Party w\/leaners, January 8-12, 2020<\/caption>\n
Poll dates<\/th>\nParty w\/leaners<\/th>\nVery<\/th>\nSomewhat<\/th>\nNot too<\/th>\nNot at all<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n71<\/td>\n21<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n73<\/td>\n19<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n68<\/td>\n19<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n62<\/td>\n23<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n57<\/td>\n29<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nRepublican<\/td>\n64<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n53<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n55<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n51<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n32<\/td>\n40<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n42<\/td>\n27<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nIndependent<\/td>\n37<\/td>\n29<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n23<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1\/8-12\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n73<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2\/19-23\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n78<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3\/24-29\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n68<\/td>\n22<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5\/3-7\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n62<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6\/14-18\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n66<\/td>\n24<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8\/4-9\/20<\/td>\nDemocrat<\/td>\n65<\/td>\n18<\/td>\n8<\/td>\n7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

There is little evidence to suport a clear enthusiasm advantage for either party.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n