{"id":507,"date":"2008-09-15T07:03:03","date_gmt":"2008-09-15T12:03:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=507"},"modified":"2011-01-12T16:58:43","modified_gmt":"2011-01-12T21:58:43","slug":"seventh-circuit-narrows-reach-of-armed-career-criminal-act","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2008\/09\/seventh-circuit-narrows-reach-of-armed-career-criminal-act\/","title":{"rendered":"Seventh Circuit Narrows Reach of Armed Career Criminal Act"},"content":{"rendered":"

On Friday, in United States v. Smith<\/a><\/em>, the Seventh Circuit held that a conviction in Indiana for criminal recklessness could not\u00a0be used as a predicate offense for a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\u00a0 Ordinarily, felons found in possession of a firearm face a maximum sentence of ten years.\u00a0 However, the ACCA raises the minimum to fifteen years for felons\u00a0who have\u00a0at least three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.”\u00a0 The Seventh Circuit’s decision to vacate Smith’s ACCA sentence last week illustrates the importance of Begay v. United States<\/a><\/em>, in which the Supreme Court held that DUI does not count as a “violent felony” for ACCA purposes.\u00a0 Prior to April, when Begay <\/em>was decided, Seventh Circuit precedent\u00a0indicated that\u00a0a felony conviction for criminal recklessness counted; now, in light of Begay<\/em>, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a new approach.<\/p>\n

Following Begay<\/em>‘s lead, Smith <\/em>states:<\/p>\n

[A] finding that [an] offense poses a serious risk of physical injury to another is a necessary<\/em>, but not a sufficient<\/em>, condition for the offense to be included within the scope of ACCA’s [definition of “violent felony”].\u00a0 The Government must also show that the predicate offense “typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Slip Op. at 8 (quoting Begay<\/em>).\u00a0 The latter requirement, according to Smith,\u00a0<\/em>means that “those crimes with a mens rea <\/em>of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the ACCA.”\u00a0 Slip Op. at 11.<\/p>\n

So, how are we to know whether a prior conviction was for conduct\u00a0that was merely negligent or reckless (as opposed to “purposeful”)?\u00a0\u00a0Smith <\/em>indicates this is normally a matter of examining the formal elements of the crime (here, the offense of criminal recklessness, as established by Indiana law), and not of considering the specific facts of the defendant’s case.\u00a0 The Indiana crime, however, presented a difficulty, as it covered dangerous acts performed “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally”–in other words, both purposeful and non-purposeful conduct.\u00a0 In such circumstances, Smith<\/em> indicates,\u00a0a court may look beyond the elements to the charging document, plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, or some other “comparable judicial record.”\u00a0 Slip Op. at 13.\u00a0 As to Smith himself, there was no formal admission or jury finding indicating that his prior convictions had involved knowing or intentional conduct; thus, the convictions could not serve as the basis for an ACCA sentencing enhancement.<\/p>\n

For criminal defense lawyers, Smith <\/em>should serve as a wake-up call (if one were needed) that much\u00a0pre-Begay <\/em>precedent on the scope of ACCA is now in doubt.\u00a0 Prior convictions for any offenses involving a mens rea <\/em>short of purpose\u00a0are at least arguably off limits as a basis for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum.\u00a0 (I say “arguably,” in part,\u00a0because\u00a0Smith <\/em>does not clearly demarcate the line between qualifying and nonqualifying degrees of mens rea<\/em>.\u00a0 Smith <\/em>seems to treat the mens rea <\/em>categories of purpose, knowledge, and intent interchangeably, but these terms are sometimes given diffent meanings in the law.\u00a0 For instance, the Model Penal Code defines knowledge as a distinct, and lower, form of mens rea<\/em> than purpose.\u00a0 Thus, in light of language in Begay <\/em>and Smith <\/em>emphasizing “purpose” as the required mens rea<\/em>, defendants might reasonably argue that a “knowledge” crime does not qualify.\u00a0 On the other hand, there is also some language in Smith <\/em>suggesting that “knowledge” would suffice.)<\/p>\n

For crimes that encompass multiple levels of mens rea<\/em>, such as Indiana’s criminal recklessness, I wonder if prosecutors will sometimes\u00a0attempt to built a record of heightened mens rea<\/em> for later ACCA purposes, for instance by requiring defendants to stipulate to “purpose” (or another qualifying mens rea<\/em>) in plea agreements or requesting special interrogatories\u00a0at trial\u00a0to determine whether the jury found a qualifying mens rea<\/em>.\u00a0 On the other hand, I also wonder if there are judges who would balk at accepting a plea agreement that includes a mens rea <\/em>stipulation showing the defendant was guilty of a much\u00a0more serious crime than that to which he is pleading.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On Friday, in United States v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit held that a conviction in Indiana for criminal recklessness could not\u00a0be used as a predicate offense for a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\u00a0 Ordinarily, felons found in possession of a firearm face a maximum sentence of ten years.\u00a0 However, the 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