{"id":5243,"date":"2009-05-20T10:30:06","date_gmt":"2009-05-20T15:30:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=5243"},"modified":"2009-05-20T10:30:06","modified_gmt":"2009-05-20T15:30:06","slug":"the-one-month-anniversary-of-arizona-v-gant-a-sign-of-things-to-come","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2009\/05\/the-one-month-anniversary-of-arizona-v-gant-a-sign-of-things-to-come\/","title":{"rendered":"The One-Month Anniversary of Arizona v. Gant: A Sign of Things to Come"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>Although we have not yet seen the flurry of end-of-term opinions sure to emerge from the Supreme Court in June, few are likely to gain as much immediate attention as Arizona v. Gant<\/em>, in which the Court imposed new Fourth Amendment limitations on the ability of police officers to search vehicles.\u00a0 The CrimProf listserve has been buzzing about Gant <\/em>since the opinion came out, and now we are beginning to see the first signs of fallout in the lower courts.\u00a0 Rising 3L Brent Simerson sent me the following insightful comments about the significance of Gant<\/em>, for which I am grateful:<\/p>\n

As one might expect, the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arizona v. Gant<\/em> has triggered changes in the way police officers and attorneys must analyze warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest in the vehicle context.\u00a0 Professor Jon Deitrich provided several interesting observations about the opinion itself in a post<\/a> last week.\u00a0 The Court held that police officers may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”\u00a0 This holding narrowed the Court’s prior holdings in Chimel v. California<\/em> and New York v. Belton<\/em>, which were largely interpreted by lower courts as permitting vehicular searches incident to a lawful arrest regardless of how improbable it was that the arrestee could access the automobile.\u00a0 Gant <\/em>will undoubtedly constrict law enforcement’s hitherto broad authority to search vehicles incident to lawful arrest, see United States v. Majette<\/em>, No. 08-4427, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (conviction vacated pursuant to Gant<\/em>), but it is too soon to describe how courts will answer tough questions presented by Gant<\/em>‘s requirements: What constitutes a “secured” arrestee?\u00a0 May police officers circumscribe the spirit of Gant <\/em>by directing the unsecured arrestee to remain within reaching distance of the passenger compartments?\u00a0 These fact-sensitive questions will take time to resolve.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

<\/p>\n

However, a practical consequence of Gant <\/em>that is already rising to the surface is the stress its holding will have on the other exceptions to the warrant requirement.\u00a0 As the Justices in Gant <\/em>carefully noted, police officers may still search a vehicle if they have the arrestee’s consent, a reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime (see United States v. Ross<\/em>, 456 U. S. 798 (1982); California v. Acevedo<\/em>, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)), a reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupants of the car possess dangerous weapons at the time of the stop (see Michigan v. Long<\/em>, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)), or if they are performing a valid inventory search of the vehicle (see Colorado v. Bertine<\/em>, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)).\u00a0 Attorneys and courts are increasingly turning to these exceptions to resolve cases arising out of incidents that occurred before the Gant <\/em>decision came down.\u00a0 The following are three recent examples:<\/p>\n