{"id":5466,"date":"2009-06-05T07:53:28","date_gmt":"2009-06-05T12:53:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=5466"},"modified":"2009-06-05T07:53:57","modified_gmt":"2009-06-05T12:53:57","slug":"confrontation-avoidance-part-i-a-good-article-to-read-while-waiting","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2009\/06\/confrontation-avoidance-part-i-a-good-article-to-read-while-waiting\/","title":{"rendered":"Confrontation Avoidance?  Part I: A Good Article to Read While Waiting"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Like nearly every criminal lawyer, I eagerly await \u2013 and wait and wait \u2013 for the Supreme Court\u2019s long overdue decision in <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotuswiki.com\/index.php?title=Melendez-Diaz_v._Massachusetts\">Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts<\/a><\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotuswiki.com\/index.php?title=Melendez-Diaz_v._Massachusetts\"> (07-591)<\/a>, the only case outstanding from the Court\u2019s November sitting (per <a href=\"http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/wp\/new-statpack-available-5\/\">SCOTUSBLOG<\/a>).<span>\u00a0 <\/span>The case addresses the prosecution\u2019s use of crime laboratory reports against the accused without testimony by the person who performed the analysis and wrote the report. <span>\u00a0<\/span>We need not get bogged down in the constitutional niceties at present, if only because its delayed appearance renders the case\u2019s auguries especially hard to read.<\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\">So while we wait for a case that is certain to affect a staggering percentage of criminal cases, both pending appeal and awaiting trial, I highly recommend J. Thomas Sullivan\u2019s timely <span>\u00a0<\/span>article, <em><a href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/lawreview\/Winter2008\/retroactivity.pdf\">Crawford,<\/a><\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/lawreview\/Winter2008\/retroactivity.pdf\"> <\/a><em><a href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/lawreview\/Winter2008\/retroactivity.pdf\">Retroactivity, and the Importance of Being Earnest,<\/a><\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/lawreview\/Winter2008\/retroactivity.pdf\"> 92 Marq. L. Rev. 231 (Winter 2008)<\/a>.<span>\u00a0 <\/span>To grossly oversimplify things, in 2004 the Supreme Court held its nose and unceremoniously dropped 25 years of case law (and countless law review articles) into law\u2019s dumpster. The discarded doctrine loosely regulated the prosecution\u2019s use of hearsay under the Sixth Amendment\u2019s confrontation clause; its flaccid \u201creliability\u201d approach had green lighted nearly all forms of hearsay imaginable (and then some).<!--more--><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\"><span><em><a href=\"http:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/us\/541\/36\/case.html\">C<\/a><\/em><em><a href=\"http:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/us\/541\/36\/case.html\">rawford v. Washington<\/a><\/em> held instead that the framers had distinguished between \u201ctestimonial\u201d and \u201cnontestimonial\u201d hearsay which are subject to vastly different conditions for admissibility. Without belaboring the history here, <em>Crawford<\/em> triggered seismic \u2013no, tectonic \u2013 shifts in the use of hearsay evidence, a feature of every trial. The only glitch was that the Court did not share with us the meaning of \u201ctestimonial hearsay\u201d or the reach of hinted-at exceptions for business records, coconspirator statements, or dying declarations.<span>\u00a0 <\/span>Hence, we are on tenterhooks to see what comes of <em>Melendez-Diaz<\/em>. <span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\"><span><span>Sullivan\u2019s article illuminates <em>Crawford<\/em> while addressing its impact on the thousands of prisoners convicted before 2004. <span>\u00a0<\/span>He approaches <em>Crawford<\/em> and the issue of retroactivity with insights based on practical experience and a scholar\u2019s command of law. Sullivan, a law professor, represented a man (Earnest) who spent 24 years in prison before his conviction was overturned based on a retroactive application of <em>Crawford<\/em>.<span>\u00a0 <\/span>The article places Earnest\u2019s story in the context of the doctrinal turmoil that has marked the confrontation clause for decades. <span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\"><span><span><span>The article deftly weaves together three different threads.<span>\u00a0 <\/span>First, there is the confrontation thread and the several false starts that preceded <em>Crawford.<\/em> Second, Justice Scalia\u2019s majority opinion in <em>Crawford<\/em> clearly broke with prior, flawed precedent and unabashedly announced a new rule (though one ostensibly based on the confrontation clause\u2019s history).<span>\u00a0 <\/span><em>Crawford<\/em>\u2019s novel approach and fresh reading of history raised the issue of retroactivity, namely, who besides Crawford himself benefits from the clause\u2019s rethinking?<span>\u00a0 <\/span>In 2007 the Supreme Court unanimously held that <em>Crawford<\/em> is not retroactive, in accordance with its longstanding \u201c<em>Teague<\/em> rule.\u201d <span>\u00a0<\/span>In Seinfeldian terms, this meant \u201cno soup for you\u201d for the vast majority of those prisoners convicted prior to <em>Crawford<\/em>.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\"><span><span><span>The third issue runs to the very core of federalism: What latitude do state courts have in retroactively applying \u201cfederal constitutional precedent more broadly than required by federal due process protections\u201d (p. 236)? <span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>In <em>Danforth v. Minnesota<\/em> (2008) the Supreme Court, according to Sullivan, afforded \u201cstates the option of formulating or applying retroactivity doctrines\u201d that deviate from the federal approach in <em>Teague<\/em> (p. 300).<span>\u00a0 <\/span>Sullivan underscores that thus far only New Mexico has fully availed itself of the discretion to apply <em>Crawford<\/em> retroactively more generously than does federal precedent, and it did so on behalf of his client Earnest.<span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\" style=\"text-align: left;\"><span><span><span><span>In sum, Sullivan\u2019s article is at once an instructive case study, a helpful guide through difficult doctrine, and a template for postconviction litigation possibilities.<span>\u00a0 <\/span>Should <em>Melendez-Diaz <\/em>break still more new doctrinal ground, as seems likely, Sullivan\u2019s article will become all the more salient, particularly in litigating state criminal appeals.<span>\u00a0\u00a0<span>\u00a0<\/span><span>\u00a0<\/span><span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><span>\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Like nearly every criminal lawyer, I eagerly await \u2013 and wait and wait \u2013 for the Supreme Court\u2019s long overdue decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (07-591), the only case outstanding from the Court\u2019s November sitting (per SCOTUSBLOG).\u00a0 The case addresses the prosecution\u2019s use of crime laboratory reports against the accused without testimony by the person [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":43,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[30,88,19,24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5466","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-criminal-justice","category-evidence","category-federal-law-legal-system","category-us-supreme-court","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5466","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/43"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5466"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5466\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5466"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5466"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5466"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}