{"id":8768,"date":"2010-01-27T13:59:15","date_gmt":"2010-01-27T18:59:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/?p=8768"},"modified":"2010-01-27T14:00:15","modified_gmt":"2010-01-27T19:00:15","slug":"seventh-circuit-decides-that-reckless-injury-and-statutory-rape-are-not-crimes-of-violence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/2010\/01\/seventh-circuit-decides-that-reckless-injury-and-statutory-rape-are-not-crimes-of-violence\/","title":{"rendered":"Seventh Circuit Decides That Reckless Injury and Statutory Rape Are Not “Crimes of Violence”"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"seventh-circuit51\"<\/a>In a series of posts (e.g., here<\/a> and here<\/a>), I\u00a0have been tracking the fallout in the Seventh Circuit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, <\/em>128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008).\u00a0 Begay <\/em>adopted a new approach\u00a0for deciding when former convictions count as “crimes of violence” that trigger the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence of the Armed Career Criminal Act.<\/p>\n

Earlier this week, the Seventh Circuit had another in its increasingly long line of post-Begay <\/em>decisions holding that this or that specific offense does not fit the new definition of “crime of violence.”\u00a0 More specifically, in United States v. McDonald<\/em> <\/a>(No. 08-2703) (Sykes, J.), the court held that first-degree reckless injury (in violation of Wis. Stat. \u00a7 940.23) and second-degree sexual assault of a child (what would be colloquially called “statutory rape,” in violation of Wis. Stat. \u00a7 948.02(2)) do not count as crimes of violence.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

To be precise, McDonald<\/em> dealt with the application of \u00a7 2K2.1 of the sentencing guidelines, not the Armed Career Criminal Act.\u00a0 However, as the court observed, the guideline’s\u00a0definition of crime of violence is\u00a0“materially identifical” to that of the statute, so it seems safe to assume that the holdings of\u00a0McDonald <\/em>would also apply to ACCA.<\/p>\n

The McDonald <\/em>holdings seem to flow quite logically from earlier Seventh Circuit cases that, in light of Begay<\/em>, restrict crimes of violence\u00a0to crimes with a mens rea <\/em>of purposefulness.\u00a0 Interestingly, though, the question of whether statutory rape counts has produced a post-Begay <\/em>circuit split, with the Second Circuit taking the opposite position from McDonald<\/em>.\u00a0 See United States v. Daye<\/em>, 571 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2009).\u00a0 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, take the same position that the Seventh has now adopted.\u00a0 (I wonder how often the Fourth and Ninth Circuits — by reputation the nation’s most conservative and liberal, respectively — are on the same side of a circuit split.\u00a0 I would think any position\u00a0agreed to\u00a0by both of those circuits should be regarded as presumptively correct!)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In a series of posts (e.g., here and here), I\u00a0have been tracking the fallout in the Seventh Circuit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008).\u00a0 Begay adopted a new approach\u00a0for deciding when former convictions count as “crimes of violence” that trigger the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"","ocean_second_sidebar":"","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"","ocean_custom_header_template":"","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"on","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[85,30,28,74,23],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8768","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-circuit-splits","category-criminal-justice","category-criminal-law-process","category-federal-sentencing","category-seventh-circuit","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8768","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8768"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8768\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8768"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8768"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/law.marquette.edu\/facultyblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8768"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}