Last week, the United States announced its support for U.N. efforts to develop a new treaty regulating international trade in conventional arms. The terms are still far from settled, but draft provisions from a U.N. review conference last summer provide a rough guide on how the treaty might work. In this post, I want to highlight some of the key provisions and then explain a likely practical hurdle to U.S. ratification. In a subsequent post, I’ll address a Second Amendment objection raised by treaty critics.

The latest draft suggests that the treaty would have four basic dimensions. First, it would establish a limited number of categorically prohibited international transfers. These include transfers in violation of a measure adopted by the U.N. Security Council pursuant to the Council’s peacekeeping authority; transfers in violation of other international obligations; and transfers made for the purpose of facilitating genocide, crimes against humanity, or certain categories of war crimes.

Second, the treaty would limit the power of states to export conventional arms by requiring assessments on whether proposed exports would contribute to or undermine peace and security. Mandatory considerations would include whether the arms could be used to commit a serious violation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or an offense under international treaties relating to terrorism. In the event of an “overriding risk” of one of these consequences, the treaty would prohibit the exporting state from authorizing the transfer. The treaty would also require exporting states to “consider taking feasible measures” to make sure that the arms are not diverted to the illicit market, used to commit gender-based violence, or used by transnational organized crime.

Military tensions between Syria and Turkey have risen dramatically in the last two days. After shooting down a Turkish fighter jet in June, Syrian government forces reportedly fired into Turkish territory and killed five civilians yesterday. Turkey has responded by shelling targets in Syria.

Though presently limited, the attacks are of keen interest to the United States. Turkey and the United States are both members of NATO and thus parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of that treaty establishes collective self-defense obligations by providing that in the event of an armed attack against any NATO member, every other member “will assist the [attacked member] by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain security of the North Atlantic area.” Thus, the Syrian attacks on Turkey might conceivably require the United States to come to Turkey’s defense.

[Update: I recently completed a more extensive analysis on the dispute; that article is available here.]

I’d like to share a couple brief thoughts on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, which has intensified pretty dramatically in recent weeks. The islands together comprise only seven square kilometers and have supported virtually no economic activity other than the collection of guano and bird feathers, but China and Japan both vigorously claim them as their own. This disagreement has been intractable for a variety of reasons. One is the economic stakes—sovereignty over the islands will dictate rights to potentially massive oil and gas deposits under the East China Sea, so there is no financial incentive for conciliation. Another reason is historical animosity—having suffered from Japanese colonialism and militarism during much of the first half of the twentieth century, China is particularly keen on defending against what it perceives to be expansionist Japanese territorial claims. Finally, the dispute is intractable for legal reasons, as I hope to illustrate below.

First some historical background: Chinese sailors reportedly used the islands for a number of purposes for centuries, but Japan formally annexed them in 1895 and then, at the end of World War II, transferred administrative authority to the United States. A 1968 study first raised the possibility of extensive oil and gas resources around the islands. Approximately four years later in 1972, China objected to Japanese sovereignty, and the United States returned the islands to Japanese administration. To demonstrate its control, Japan has since leased the islands to private businessmen, built a weather station and heliport, conducted land surveys, and patrolled the surrounding waters. China has consistently objected that these activities are irrelevant, at least in part because the annexation was illegal and Japan never had sovereignty to begin with.