Prior Conviction as an Element of a Crime: The Effect of Stipulations After State v. Warbelton

In January of this year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the defendant’s conviction for stalking in State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, 759 N.W.2d 557.  In doing so, the court held that a defendant in a stalking case cannot prevent the State from submitting evidence of the existence of the defendant’s prior violent felony conviction, an element of the crime, by stipulating to the conviction before trial.   

Stipulations to prior convictions became a powerful tool for defense attorneys in Wisconsin following State v. McAllister, 153 Wis. 2d 523, 451 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1989).  A precursor to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Old Chief v. United States, the McAllister court held that the State could not submit evidence of the details of the defendant’s prior felony conviction if the defendant offered to stipulate to that element before trial.  The court concluded that the details of the conviction were no longer relevant once the defendant stipulated to it.  The State could satisfy the element by submitting a certified record of the defendant’s conviction to the jury. 

The court in State v. Alexander addressed the derivative question left by McAllister: may the defendant completely prevent the jury from considering the prior conviction element by stipulating to the prior conviction before trial? 

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Another Questionable Statement by a Prosecutor

seventh-circuitOn several occasions recently, the Seventh Circuit has been critical of statements made by prosecutors to jurors.  (See, for instance, my posts here, here, and here.)  Another questionable comment by a prosecutor was the subject of this week’s decision in United States v. Myers (No. 07-3658) (Manion, J.).

Myers was tried on arson charges.  During closing arguments, defense counsel highlighted the fact that gasoline was not found by investigators on the floor of the building that Myers allegedly burned down.  In response, the prosecutor stated:

[A]ny speculation on the part of [defense counsel] about why or why there wasn’t gasoline can be easily explained by the fact that there were firefighters that were in there that night trying to extinguish that fire with water.  Water has a tendency to sweep through and remove all sorts of different things that might have been on the ground.  So, ladies and gentlemen, that’s an easy explainable different part of what [defense counsel] was trying to suggest.

On appeal following his conviction, Myers challenged this statement as prosecutorial misconduct. 

In addressing Myers’ argument, the Seventh Circuit noted that the government was free to argue “the mere possibility that water could have cleaned or diluted the surface of the carpet.”  The problem was that “the government did not couch its argument in such hypothetical terms.” 

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Explaining Sentences in Wisconsin and Federal Court

I have a new paper on SSRN entitled “Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences.”  As I observed in a recent post, I’ve become very interested in the way that sentences are explained to defendants, and how appellate review of explanations can potentially contribute both to procedural justice goals and to substantively better sentences.  My forthcoming article in the Florida State Law Review focuses on “explanation review” in the federal system.  The new paper focuses on the contrasting experience in Wisconsin and proposes a general framework for explanation review that blends the best features of the Wisconsin and federal systems. 

As I see it, the basic flaw of the federal system is to permit sentencing judges to avoid any explicit engagement with the purposes of punishment if they impose a sentence within the recommended guidelines range.  In a sense, the basic flaw of the Wisconsin system is the reverse: the Wisconsin Supreme Court permits sentencing judges to avoid any explicit engagement with the state sentencing guidelines (or any other objective benchmark); little more is required than an explanation that expressly invokes the purposes of punishment and references a few case-specific facts.  My proposal seeks to promote engagement with both guidelines and purposes.

I presented the paper earlier this month at the Marquette Criminal Appeals Conference.  It will appear in a symposium issue of the Marquette Law Review this winter.  The abstract appears after the jump. 

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