It Takes Two to Tango

Historically, courts have declined to impose aiding and abetting liability regarding crimes for which two parties are essential to commission.  As the Model Penal Code puts it, accomplice liability does not extend to conduct that is “inevitably incident” to the main offense; more colloquially, accomplice liability will not apply to crimes for which it “takes two to tango.”  Thus, a buyer of drugs for personal use does not aid or abet the dealer’s distribution; a woman who voluntarily accompanies a man across state lines for purposes of prostitution does not facilitate his violation of the Mann Act; the patron of a speakeasy does not aid and abet the illegal sale of alcohol.  And, as of today, a person who telephones a drug trafficker to order cocaine for personal use does not violate 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Section 843(b) offenses are commonly known as “phone counts.”  The statute makes it a felony, punishable by up to four years in prison, to knowingly or intentionally  use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under the Controlled Substances Act.  Some Circuits, including the Seventh, had held that a buyer’s use of the phone in purchasing drugs “facilitates” the seller’s (felony) drug distribution within the meaning of § 843(b).  Today, in Abuelhawa v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress, legislating in light of the common-law tradition discussed above, did not intend such a result.  Although the term “facilitate” could be subject to the broad construction urged by the government, the Court found that Congress likely intended the term “facilitate” to be construed similar to “aid and abet.”  The Court noted that Congress generally made simple drug possession a misdemeanor, and transforming misdemeanor possession into a felony simply because a phone was involved would skew “the congressional calibration of respective buyer-seller penalties.”

Phone counts are often used as a means of resolving cases involving greater charges, like conspiracy to distribute.  In those situations, even if the caller is primarily a user, he may intend at least some of the drugs for re-distribution, or he may be middling transactions for others.  But simply using the phone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase is (now) outside the scope of the statute.

Continue ReadingIt Takes Two to Tango

Environmental Sentencing: Its Bark Is Worse Than Its Bite — Should We Care?

I have a new paper on SSRN about the sentencing of environmental offenders.  The title is “Bark and Bite: The Environmental Sentencing Guidelines after Booker.”  Using date collected by the United States Sentencing Commission, I show that judges sentence below the range recommended by the federal sentencing guidelines in an unusually high percentage of environmental cases, approaching sixty percent in some years.

Many environmentalists are apt to bristle at the apparent demonstration that federal judges are “soft” on environmental crime.  Given how little the government must prove to get an environmental conviction, however — prosecutors need not show either harm to the environment or an intent to harm the environment — I am not convinced that judges really are devaluing the environment through their sentencing decisions.  Still, I think the data warrant a rethinking of the environmental guidelines in order to give them more credibility with judges.

Here is the abstract: 

Continue ReadingEnvironmental Sentencing: Its Bark Is Worse Than Its Bite — Should We Care?

The One-Month Anniversary of Arizona v. Gant: A Sign of Things to Come

Although we have not yet seen the flurry of end-of-term opinions sure to emerge from the Supreme Court in June, few are likely to gain as much immediate attention as Arizona v. Gant, in which the Court imposed new Fourth Amendment limitations on the ability of police officers to search vehicles.  The CrimProf listserve has been buzzing about Gant since the opinion came out, and now we are beginning to see the first signs of fallout in the lower courts.  Rising 3L Brent Simerson sent me the following insightful comments about the significance of Gant, for which I am grateful:

As one might expect, the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arizona v. Gant has triggered changes in the way police officers and attorneys must analyze warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest in the vehicle context.  Professor Jon Deitrich provided several interesting observations about the opinion itself in a post last week.  The Court held that police officers may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”  This holding narrowed the Court’s prior holdings in Chimel v. California and New York v. Belton, which were largely interpreted by lower courts as permitting vehicular searches incident to a lawful arrest regardless of how improbable it was that the arrestee could access the automobile.  Gant will undoubtedly constrict law enforcement’s hitherto broad authority to search vehicles incident to lawful arrest, see United States v. Majette, No. 08-4427, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (conviction vacated pursuant to Gant), but it is too soon to describe how courts will answer tough questions presented by Gant‘s requirements: What constitutes a “secured” arrestee?  May police officers circumscribe the spirit of Gant by directing the unsecured arrestee to remain within reaching distance of the passenger compartments?  These fact-sensitive questions will take time to resolve.

Continue ReadingThe One-Month Anniversary of Arizona v. Gant: A Sign of Things to Come
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