Although the Supreme Court has yet to release an opinion in American Electric Power v. Connecticut (previously discussed here), many commentators approaching the case from divergent points of view believe that the Court will likely reject the common law public nuisance cause of action, which is based on the power companies’ creation and release of substantial amounts of greenhouse gases that have contributed to global warming.  Aside from the jurisdictional and substantive issues that the AEP case raises directly, the issue lurking under the surface in that case, and made explicit in at least two other international cases, is the extent to which claims alleging environmental damage should be adjudicated on the basis of rights entirely separate from those which humans may assert for the benefit of individual human interests.  Stated differently, the problem of redressing harms caused by our overconsumption of fossil fuels and various other environmental harms raises what I believe to be two extremely provocative questions, neither of which will be answered here, but which provide a starting point for more effectively and honestly addressing issues of environmental harms.  First, how does a society decide to whom/what rights will be granted, and second, can a system of human laws accurately and effectively provide rights to nonhuman natural systems?

As an initial matter, perhaps notions of “granting” or “providing” rights already obfuscate a fundamental question; that is, is it honest to say that any human can actually grant rights, or are humans solely in a position to deny fulfillment of rights that exist inherently for the benefit of all beings?