On Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a longstanding circuit split on the question of whether a federal sentencing judge may set the length of a prison term based on what the judge believes will be necessary for a defendant to complete a prison-based treatment program.  The case is Tapia v. United States (No. 10-5400).

After being convicted of alien smuggling and bail jumping, Tapia was sentenced to 51 months in prison.  The judge made clear that the sentence was based, at least in part, on what the judge anticipated would be necessary for Tapia to complete a drug treatment program:

I am going to impose a 51-month sentence[:] 46 months [for smuggling] plus five months for the bail jump[.]  [O]ne of the factors that affects this is the need to provide treatment.  In other words, so she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.

The dispute over the permissibility of the judge’s reasoning has its roots in the origins of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  

David Holman has a helpful new article exploring the mess that has become the Armed Career Criminal Act jurisprudence in the wake of Begay v. United States. (I’ve blogged about this unfolding jurisprudence several times, e.g., here and here.)  The ACCA, of course, imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for felons in possession of a firearm who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony” or a serious drug offense. It is the definition of “violent felony” that has occasioned so much litigation and so many unsatisfying judicial decisions over the past couple of years.  I’m glad to see David’s article because I think legal scholars have not been paying nearly enough attention to recent developments in this important area of federal criminal law.

I think David is correct to trace the jurisprudential difficulties to the tension between two lines of Supreme Court decisions.