Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What If the Defendant Thought He Was Breaking the Wrong Law?

seventh-circuit2When Doli Pulungan attempted to export 100 military-grade riflescopes to Indonesia in 2007, he knew he was breaking the law.  He was just wrong about which law.  His clients told him there was a ban on military exports to Indonesia, but the ban actually expired in 2005.  Instead, Pulungan violated a different law that requires a license in order to export “defense articles.”  Thus, his elaborate ruse of shipping through Saudi Arabia in order to evade the nonexistent Indonesia embargo did him no good.  A jury ultimately convicted him of “willfully” attempting to violate the export license law, and a judge sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.

But was his violation truly “willful”?  On appeal, the government conceded that “willfully” means “with knowledge that a license is required,” but argued that the evidence established Pulungan had this knowledge.  The government relied chiefly on Pulungan’s dishonesty with business associates about what he intended to do with the riflescopes and his intent to violate the nonexistent embargo.  But Pulungan’s dishonesty is readily explained by his belief that he was violating the wrong law.  Thus, as the Seventh Circuit saw it in United States v. Pulungan (No. 08-3000), the government was really invoking the doctrine of transferred intent: “As the prosecutor sees things, an intent to violate one law is as good as the intent to violate any other.”  The court, per Chief Judge Easterbrook, was unmoved by this use of the transferred intent doctrine and overturned Pulungan’s conviction. 

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Seventh Circuit Case of the Week: The Jude Saga Continues

seventh-circuit1For a resident of Milwaukee, there can be no question about the marquee Seventh Circuit case last week: the court decided the appeals of three of the defendants convicted in the notorious Frank Jude beating.  In United States v. Bartlett, the court (per Chief Judge Easterbrook) affirmed the convictions of all three defendants and the sentences of two.  However, the Seventh Circuit also vacated the sentence of Jon Bartlett, who will now have to be resentenced in the lower court.

As everyone living in the Milwaukee area knows, Bartlett and his codefendants were police officers convicted of civil rights violations for the savage beating suffered by Jude, a biracial man.  For many, the Jude case, which received intense local media coverage, was emblematic of the state of police-community relations in inner-city Milwaukee. 

Bartlett’s “win” on appeal resulted from a discrepancy in his sentencing. 

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Seventh Circuit Case of the Week: Sentencing Judges, You’ve Got Some ‘Splaining to Do

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David Morrow was sentenced to an eye-popping 504 months in prison for conspiring to sell crack cocaine.  This extraordinary punishment was ordered despite the fact that Morrow was diagnosed with diabetes in 2006 and had a leg amputated a few months later.  At sentencing, counsel identifed Morrow’s health concerns as a mitigating factor, as did the presentence investigation report prepared by a probation officer.  Yet, the sentencing judge said nothing about Morrow’s health problems in imposing a sentence twelve years above the minimum recommended by the federal sentencing guidelines.

Not so fast, said the Seventh Circuit last week in United States v. Harris (Nos. 08-1192, 08-1543, & 08-1694).  The court, per Judge Williams, vacated Morrow’s sentence because the sentencing judge failed to address the health argument, which was not an argument “clearly without merit”:

[W]e cannot assure ourselves that the district court weighed Morrow’s health complications against other factors when it imposed the 504-month sentence, as we see no indication that the district court considered it.  We therefore remand Morrow’s case for resentencing.

In emphasizing the importance of thorough sentence explanations, particularly to demonstrate that the defendant’s arguments for lenience were at least considered, Harris indicates (contrary to an earlier prediction of mine) that the Seventh Circuit’s important decision in United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005), is still alive and well.  Sometimes it is nice to be proven wrong. 

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