Seventh Circuit Weighs in on Crime-Lab Evidence
The Supreme Court was not the only court wrestling this week with the admissibility of crime-lab evidence. A day after the Justices heard oral argument in Briscoe v. Virginia, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Turner (No. 08-3109). Both cases put into question the vitality of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
A jury convicted Turner of selling crack to an undercover police officer. The drugs were sent to the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed by a chemist named Hanson, who confirmed that they were indeed crack. The government intended to call Hanson to testify to this effect, but she went on maternity leave before the trial. So Hanson’s supervisor, Block, was summoned instead. Based on Hanson’s notes and data, Block testified that he agreed with her conclusion that the drugs were crack.
On appeal, Turner argued that Block’s testimony violated Melendez-Diaz.

It’s almost like Judge Easterbrook read my article. I have a
Police found marijuana hidden in a car that Maurice Crowder and a colleague tried to ship from Arizona to Illinois. Crowder was then charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for two crimes: attempted possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Sounds like double-dipping, right? After all, both crimes of conviction arose from the same underlying criminal plot. Crowder appealed to the Seventh Circuit on this basis, arguing that he could not be punished for both crimes.