The Importance of Being Logical

I went to see the Star Trek movie this past weekend with my twelve-year-old son, Andrew.  He was the one dressed in full Klingon regalia (true story).  The star of the movie is undoubtedly everyone’s favorite Vulcan, Mr. Spock.  As you will recall, Spock is the character who always insists on behaving logically.  Seeing the movie made me reflect on legal education and the importance of being logical.

Teaching Constitutional Law, it is easy to get wrapped up in ideological conflicts and to overlook the key role that logical syllogisms play in the construction of Supreme Court opinions.  Certainly the students do not immediately grasp the connection between formal logic and Supreme Court decision-making.  They begin the semester with the assumption that the members of the Court merely vote their ideologies.  As the students assimilate the various interpretive theories for reading the text, such as textualism or intentionalism, they flirt with the possibility of deriving the meaning of the Constitution in an objective manner.  However, the inconsistent manner in which the members of the Court employ these interpretive methods soon frustrates a fair proportion of the class.  Some students begin to drift towards the view that the decisions of the Court are merely bald assertions of political power, while others begin to flirt with nihilism and the belief that the entire interpretive enterprise is arbitrary.

My personal view is that the United States Constitution is a political document, constructed via compromise between various interest groups and left intentionally ambiguous in several key respects. 

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Doing the Interrogation Two-Step

As all law students (and viewers of crime dramas) know, an incriminating statement generally cannot be used against a defendant if the defendant was not given the basic Miranda warnings before the statement was elicited by police.  But what if the defendant gives a second, warned statement after a first, unwarned statement?  In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme Court seemed to give a green light to the use of such statements.  More recently, though, the Court ruled that a second statement was not admissible in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), in which police officers deliberately employed a two-step interrogation technique in order to minimize the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings. 

The trouble is that no single opinion drew a majority in Seibert.  A plurality opinion adopted a multifactor test for two-step interrogations, in which the reviewing court would determine whether a “reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes” would have understood that it was possible to refuse further questioning after the Miranda warnings were given.  Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy, providing the crucial fifth vote for the Court’s holding, wrote separately and advocated a different test that focused on whether the police were deliberately circumventing Miranda.  The Seibert split has caused continuing confusion in the lower courts.  (As Jon Deitrich observed in a post earlier today, Justice Scalia recently saved the Supreme Court from a similarly divided result in Arizona v. Gant.)

The Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to choose between the plurality and Kennedy approaches in its opinion last week in United States v. Heron (No. 07-3726). 

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After the issuance of a particularly fractured decision, featuring multiple concurrences and dissents, former Chief Justice Rehnquist once quipped, “I didn’t know we had that many people on our Court.”  The quote came to mind after reading a recent Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Gant, in which Justice Scalia did something rather unusual and, from the perspective of those tasked with application of the Court’s often splintered decisions, laudatory.  He provided the fifth vote needed to produce a majority opinion, despite the fact that he did not entirely agree with the opinion he joined.

In Gant, the Court addressed the scope of the “search-incident-to-arrest” exception to the warrant requirement established in Chimel v. California.  In Chimel, the Court held that police may, incident to an arrest, search the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, i.e., the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.  In New York v. Belton, the Court extended the rule, holding that police may also search the passenger compartment of the vehicle from which an arrestee was taken.  Most lower courts understood Belton to permit a vehicle search incident to arrest even when there was no real possibility that the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.  Some courts even allowed a search under Belton when the handcuffed arrestee had already left the scene.

Gant presented an opportunity to narrow this construction of the Belton rule.  

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