New York Nuisance Law Survives NLRA Preemption

Newyork Thanks to Bill Herbert (Deputy Chair and Counsel to the New York PERB) for letting us know about a recent New York Court of Appeals ruling concerning whether a nuisance suit under New York law was preempted by the NLRA.  Readers will recall that Prof. Hirsch and I debated the relationship between the NLRA and state laws in our recent on-line debate in PENNumbra and it is a topic I recently wrote on separately in the captive audience meeting context.

In this case, Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Fishman, 08-164 (Nov. 24, 2008), the New York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) found in a 4-2 decision (one Justice not participating) that the plaintiffs’ private nuisance cause of action was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  More specifically, the court found that:

[E]ven if one were to assume that the drumming [outside of the building by the union] constituted arguably “protected” conduct under the NLRA, as the Union argues and the Appellate Division implied, it does not necessarily follow that our state courts are foreclosed from adjudicating plaintiffs’ claim. This point was made clear in Sears, Roebuck & Co., where the United States Supreme Court held that a state trespass claim lodged by an employer against picketers — challenging the location of the picketing as opposed to the picketing itself — was not preempted by the NLRA even though trespass was arguably protected under the Act (436 US at 198-204) . . . .

Balancing the state interest in adjudicating private nuisance claims against the interference with the NLRB’s ability to determine matters committed to it by the NLRA and the risk that state courts will prohibit conduct otherwise protected by the Act, we conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt the jurisdiction of state courts to adjudicate the tortious conduct alleged here.

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Court Holds That Wikipedia Entries Are “Inherently Unreliable”

On the Legal Writing Prof blog, Jim Levy noted today (hat-tipping BNA Internet Law News) that a court expressly rejected an appellant’s attempt to rely on Wikipedia.

In State v. Flores, an unpublished decision by the Texas Court of Appeals for the 14th District dated October 23, 2008, the court refused the appellant’s request to take judicial notice of a Wikipedia entry describing the “John Reid interrogation technique.”  The court reasoned in footnote 3 that Wikipedia entries are inherently unreliable because they can be written and edited anonymously by anyone.  The court relied on a recent article from the Wall Street Journal entitled Wikipedians Leave Cyberspace, Meet in Egypt, noting that the egalitarian nature of Wikipedia is both “its greatest strength and its greatest weakness.”

The Flores decision is also available on Westlaw and Lexis at, respectively, 2008 WL 4683960 (Tex.App.-Hous (14th Dist.)) and 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8010.

Which reminded me of another recent Wikipedia-related entry on that blog, a note about Lee Peoples’ article, “The Citation of Wikipedia in American Judicial Opinions.”

I haven’t read Peoples’ article yet, but I should, because this issue of the reliability of Wikipedia and its citation by courts has been bubbling up lately.  It think this Texas court was exactly right: “Wikipedia entries are inherently unreliable because they can be written and edited anonymously by anyone.”  I will admit that I sometimes read a Wikipedia entry if I want background information about a topic.  I do not think, though, that I would cite an entry as proof of anything in court.  What do you think?

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Copyrighted Works Must Be Novel and Nonobvious

To anyone who knows IP law, the title of this post looks like either ignorance or craziness. I assure you, it’s not ignorance. Everyone knows that one of the distinguishing features between copyrights and patents is that patents require novelty and nonobviousness, and copyrights don’t. All you need to get a copyright is to have an “original” work of authorship — and “originality” is an extremely low threshold. It doesn’t require that the content be new, and it certainly doesn’t require that it be nonobvious; it only requires that it be yours (that is, “original” to you).

That’s the theory, but I don’t think that’s the practice. I was struck by this thought (ow!) over the weekend as I was reading materials on substantial similarity and the idea-expression distinction. (Perhaps this thought occurs to all copyright lawyers at some point; maybe it’s just my week.) There are certain famous passages that get intoned by copyright scholars and practitioners to explain such concepts, a bit like the missal in a Catholic mass. Originality is sometimes explained with this reading from the book of Learned Hand:

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