On Friday, September 30, 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki (Aulaqi), a U.S. citizen and well-known al-Qaeda figure, was targeted and killed during a U.S. drone strike in Yemen. Samir Khan, also a U.S. citizen, was killed in the same attack. Khan was the editor of Inspire, an English-Language al-Qaeda magazine that, among other things, publishes how-to articles designed to help terrorists build bombs for jihadist attacks against Americans.  Awlaki was perhaps best known in the U.S. for planning the failed underwear bombing of a commercial airliner over Detroit in 2009 (the alleged bomber’s criminal jury trial is currently underway), and for helping plan the 2009 massacre at Fort Hood.

Al-Awlaki’s assassination continues to draw heavy criticism both in the U.S. and abroad because he is believed to be the first U.S. citizen targeted and killed by the executive branch of the federal government without regard for Fifth Amendment due process.  Ron Paul published an op-ed in the New York Daily News expressing his outrage at al-Awlaki’s execution.  Paul, in response to what he calls the illegal murder of a U.S. citizen, is calling for President Obama’s impeachment.

The legality of the extrajudicial assassination of al-Awlaki was the subject of a civil suit in 2010.  After learning that his son had been placed on a CIA/Joint Special Operations Command “kill list”, al-Awlaki’s father brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against President Obama, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and CIA Director Leon Panetta.  In an attempt to enjoin the executive branch from killing his son, al-Awlaki introduced several claims based in both constitutional and tort law.  The court’s lengthy opinion begins with a compelling recitation of the questions presented:

How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death? Can a U.S. citizen –himself or through another — use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization? How can the courts, as plaintiff proposes, make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged threats to national security, determine the imminence of those threats, weigh the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military force against such threats is justified? When would it ever make sense for the United States to disclose in advance to the “target” of contemplated military action the precise standards under which it will take that military action? And how does the evolving AQAP relate to core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting AQAP (or its principals) under the September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force?

Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2010).

Before contemplating the more compelling issues, the court first decided the issue of standing.  Al-Awlaki’s father lacked “next-friend” standing because he failed to provide an adequate reason justifying why Anwar could not appear in court on his own behalf.  His father claimed that if Anwar presented himself to authorities he would be exposed to attack.  The court disagreed, citing public government statements indicating that if al-Awlaki surrendered peacefully he could not be executed without due process.

The court also denied third party standing, holding that Anwar’s father could not show that a parent suffers an injury in fact if his adult child is threatened with a future extrajudicial killing.  Anwar’s status as an adult was of particular importance because a parent does not have a constitutionally (or common law) protected liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his adult child free from government influence.

Prudential standing was denied because, among other reasons, the court refused to “unnecessarily adjudicate rights” that it believed al-Awlaki did not wish to assert himself.  The court noted that al-Awlaki made numerous public statements professing his contempt for the U.S. legal system.  Al-Awlaki did not believe that he was bound by U.S. laws because, in his view, they are contrary to the teachings of Allah.  I personally find it difficult to believe that a person would not want to contest his own assassination, but it also seems unlikely that al-Awlaki would wish to assert legal rights in a court system that he did not recognize as authoritative, especially in a country that he openly despised.

Ultimately, the most compelling issues were not addressed because the court found that judicial review was inappropriate.  The court held that separation of powers and the political question doctrine prohibited interfering with the executive branch’s orders with respect to military action abroad.   Meaningful review was deemed impossible, because it would require an unmanageable assessment of the quality of the President’s interpretation of military intelligence and his resulting decision (based upon that intelligence) to use military force against terrorist targets overseas:

[T]his Court does not hold that the Executive possesses “unreviewable authority to order the assassination of any American whom he labels an enemy of the state.” (citation omitted), the Court only concludes that it lacks the capacity to determine whether a specific individual in hiding overseas, whom the Director of National Intelligence has stated is an “operational” member of AQAP, (citation omitted), presents such a threat to national security that the United States may authorize the use of lethal force against him. This Court readily acknowledges that it is a “drastic measure” for the United States to employ lethal force against one of its own citizens abroad, even if that citizen is currently playing an operational role in a “terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Saudi, Korean, Yemeni, and U.S. targets since January 2009,”(citation omitted) But as the D.C. Circuit explained in Schneider, a determination as to whether “drastic measures should be taken in matters of foreign policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication, but of policymaking.” (citation omitted) Because decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textually committed to the political branches, and because courts are functionally ill-equipped to make the types of complex policy judgments that would be required to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that the political question doctrine bars judicial resolution of this case.

Al-Aulaqi, 727 F.Supp.2d at 52-53.

It is unfortunate that the Aulaqi case never made it beyond the issue of standing, but perhaps that was the proper outcome.  Although Awlaki was a U.S. citizen (and a citizen of Yemen), he was also clearly a member of al-Qaeda.  Shortly after 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).  The AUMF provides that:

[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001…in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States…

Everyone (except for the guy who leaves “9/11 was inside job” comments beneath every news article on the internet) knows that al-Qaeda is the organization that planned and committed the terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11.  Al-Awlaki was indisputably a member of al-Qaeda.  The Executive’s killing of al-Awlaki was certainly aimed at preventing future acts of international terrorism against the United States.  If the AUMF can be read as authorizing al-Awlaki’s killing, then it would appear that the President assassinated him with congressional approval.  In that scenario, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown would indicate that the President was acting at the highest ebb of his authority.

Still, many columnists and politicians like Ron Paul believe that Obama’s decision was illegal on due process grounds.  Might Ron Paul be engaging in political grandstanding?  I do seem to remember hearing something about an upcoming election.  On the other hand, the AUMF only authorizes necessary and appropriate force.  In his suit against the Executive, al-Aulaqi suggested that imminence is the key factor in determining whether lethal force is justified.  It would have been interesting to find out what legal standard the court would apply to the use of lethal force on foreign soil against a member of al-Qaeda holding U.S. citizenship, but that issue was never addressed.

Was the force used against al-Awlaki necessary and appropriate?  It seems difficult to determine without a meaningful presentation of evidence against al-Awlaki.  Personally, I don’t think I’ll hold my breath waiting for the day that the general public is offered an explanation as to why al-Awlaki couldn’t be captured and tried in a U.S. courtroom.  It is troubling to know that the President can order the extrajudicial execution of a U.S. citizen based upon secret evidence.  On the other hand, it has been said that the Constitution is not a suicide pact, and it’s comforting to know that the President is tracking and killing those who are actively trying to kill Americans.

After reading the al-Aulaqi opinion, I was left feeling unsatisfied with the court’s decision to defer to the other branches of government, but I understood why it did so.  In many ways, the moral issue of al-Awlaki’s murder leaves me feeling the same way.  I think it’s unfortunate that al-Awlaki was not indicted, captured, and tried in Federal court.  I also understand that applying traditional due process to a terrorist abroad might create a logistical nightmare and place many innocent lives in danger.  Is this a slippery slope?  If so, wouldn’t requiring the judicial approval of military strategy abroad be just as slippery?  Either way, I respect those who speak out in favor of due process.  I also wonder how many of those people, if faced with the same choice as the President, would choose differently.