Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Crediting the Lost Opportunity to Serve a Concurrent Sentence

seventh circuitSince separate state and federal prosecutions are permissible for the same criminal act, federal law appropriately permits district judges to impose federal sentences so that they run concurrently with states sentences; that way, defendants can be protected from what would otherwise amount to double punishment for the same crime.  But what if federal prosecution is delayed, and the state sentence has already been served by the time sentencing occurs in federal court?  The federal sentence cannot be made concurrent in those circumstances.  Is it permissible then for the district judge to reduce the federal sentence length in light of the missed opportunity for a concurrent sentence?

At least three circuits have answered the question in the affirmative, but the Seventh Circuit has not yet provided its answer.  Last week, though, the court came close, holding in United States v. Villegas-Miranda (No. 08-2308) (Williams, J.) that district judges must at least respond when a “consecutive sentences” argument is one of a defendant’s principal arguments for a reduced sentence. 

Villegas-Miranda follows in a very interesting line of cases from United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005), which held that a district judge must “give reasons for its sentencing decision and address all of a defendant’s principal arguments that ‘are not so weak as to not merit discussion.'”  (Page 5, quoting  Cunningham.)  (My recent article on what I call the “Cunningham explanation requirement” just appeared in print at 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 459; an earlier draft on SSRN is here.)

Although a consecutive sentences argument was one of Villegas-Miranda’s two principal arguments at sentencing, the district judge in his case did not respond to it.  On appeal, however, the government contended that the consecutive sentences argument did not trigger Cunningham because it was “so weak as to not merit discussion.”  Villegas-Miranda thus illustrates how Cunningham creates an opportunity for the Seventh Circuit to provide a preliminary assessment of a sentencing argument without definitively ruling on its strength. 

In the end, the court agreed with Villegas-Miranda that his consecutive sentences argument should have been addressed, relying particularly on the fact that several other circuits had previously found the argument to have merit.

Other new opinions in criminal cases were:

United States v. Thyfault (No. 07-2769) (Bauer, J.) (reversing dismissal of charges on issue preclusion grounds).

United States v. Hart (No. 07-3395) (Ripple, J.) (“[W]e hold that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), as a categorical matter, is not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.”).

United States v. Hargrove (No. 06-2883) (Bauer, J.) (affirming constitutionality of mail fraud statute over vagueness challenge).

United States v. Elst (No. 09-1175) (Tinder, J.) (affirming denial of motion to suppress based on good-faith exception to exclusionary rule).

United States v. Oros (No. 08-2511) (Williams, J.) (affirming conviction and sentence for bribery).

United States v. Gibbs (No. 08-2186) (Wood, J.) (vacating sentence based on district court’s failure to calculate sentencing guidelines range).

United States v. Salem (No. 08-2034) (Tinder, J.) (remanding for hearing on Brady issue).

United States v. Deloney (No. 07-3451) (Bauer, J.) (affirming reasonableness of sentence in crack trafficking case).

United States v. Canady (No. 08-1267) (Williams, J.) (affirming conviction and sentence in felon-in-possession case).

United States v. Fouse (No. 07-3945) (Rovner, J.) (affirming conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine).

United States v. Shabaz (No. 08-3751) (Wood, J.) (affirming denial of motion to suppress confession).

United States v. Corson (No. 08-2094) (Tinder, J.) (affirming defendants’ robbery convictions).

United States v. Booker (No. 07-3094) (Williams, J.) (“[W]e remand for resentencing because Booker’s prior involuntary manslaughter conviction does not qualify as a ‘crime of violence.'”).

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