The citizenry of the United States awoke to shocking news this morning . . . the United States Patent and Trademark Office has rescinded its controversial continuation application rules package (what was that about a Nobel Peace Prize?). The link to the press release is here.
These controversial rules—which sought to limit the number of continuation applications, a type of patent application that claims priority back to an earlier filed application—had prompted vociferous opposition from the patent community because it would limit strategic choices related to patent prosecution. Indeed, I derived the title of this blog from comments posted today on the Patently-O Blog.
I had long threatened a blog post that advised newly appointed Commissioner Kappos what he should do in response to the issues posed by Tafas. Conveniently, Commissioner Kappos actually undertook the strategy that I would propose—rescinding the rules, filing a motion to dismiss the case, while at same time seeking to vacate the federal district-court decision (a motion joined by one of the plaintiffs, GlaxoSmith Kline). As I have discussed in an article published last year (First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 John Marshall L. Rev. 29 (2008)), the decision of the district court was filled with a number of mistaken premises about the nature of substantive notice-and-comment rulemaking in the patent administrative state.
Notably, the issues raised by Tafas may still remain very much with us. First, one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Tafas, has refused to join in the government and GSK’s joint motion, precisely because he wishes that precedent to stand. Second, the problems that prompted the issuance of these rules still stand. A former Marquette student, Kevin Rizzuto, in our most recent issue of the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (13 Marquette Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 411), undertook an empirical analysis of continuation practice. Kevin concluded that continuation practice needed to be substantively revised to prevent long-pending applications and to limit non-divisional continuation applications. Finally, the conflict at the heart of Tafas—the appropriate role of the USPTO in governing the new administrative state—will continue to recur given the increasing complexity of the patent administrative state. Section Two of the Patent Act (which was based on administrative practice of the USPTO in the 1870s) may have finally outlived its usefulness in terms of structuring the USPTO’s governing authority. Like any nightmare, then, the conflicts that drove Tafas may still be with us, as we awake in the morning.
The citizenry of the United States awoke to shocking news this morning….the United States Patent and Trademark Office has rescinded its controversial continuation application rules package (what was that about a Nobel Peace Prize?). The link to the press release is here: http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp.
These controversial rules—which sought to limit the number of continuation application, a type of patent application that claims priority back to an earlier filed application—had prompted vociferous opposition from the patent community because it would limit strategic choices related to patent prosecution. Indeed, I derived the title of this blog from comments posted today on the Patently-O Blog.
I had long threatened a blog post that advised newly appointed Commisioner Kappos should do in response to the issues posed by Tafas. Conveniently, Commissioner Kappos actually undertook the strategy that I would propose—rescinding the rules, filing a motion to dismiss the case, while at same time seeking to vacate the federal district-court decision (a motion joined by one of the plaintiffs, GlaxoSmith Kline). As I have discussed in an article published last year (First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 John Marshall L. Rev. 29 (2008)), the decision of the district court was filled a number of mistaken premises about the nature of substantive notice and comment rulemaking in the patent administrative state.
Notably, the issues raised by Tafas may still remain very much with of us. First, one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Tafas has refused to join in the government and GSK’s joint motion, precisely because he wishes that precedent to stand. Second, the problems that prompted the issuance of these rules still stand. A former Marquette student, Kevin Rizzuto, in our most recent issue of the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (13 Marquette Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 411), undertook an empirical analysis of continuation practice. Kevin concluded that continuation practice needed to be substantively revised to prevent long-pending applications and to limit non-divisional continuation applications. Finally, the conflict at the heart of Tafas— the appropriate role of the USPTO in governing the new administrative state—will continue to recur given the increasing complexity of the patent administrative state. Section Two of the Patent Act (which was based on administrative practice of the USPTO in the 1870s) may have finally outlived it usefulness in terms of structuring the USPTO’s governing authority. Like any nightmare, then, the conflicts that drove Tafas may still be with us, as we awake in the morning.