In an earlier post, I offered some preliminary thoughts about the Supreme Court’s six criminal statutory interpretation cases last term. I observed that Justice Scalia’s textualist approach now seems dominant on the Court. The six opinions thus reflect a great deal of effort to parse the texts of the statutes, and we get a number of passages like this one from Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2009):
In ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the sentence.
Stirring prose, no? One would hardly guess that two years of a man’s life were riding on this characterization of an obscure grammatical norm. Whatever else might be said for or against textualism, it does lead to opinions in which there is sometimes a disconcerting disconnect between the Court’s dry rhetoric and the human realities of crime and punishment.
In keeping with the Court’s current textualism, comparatively little attention is paid in the six opinions to legislative history, which is either ignored altogether or wheeled out as an apparent afterthought.
Of course, even textualists like Scalia acknowledge that texts are sometimes ambiguous. In such circumstances, rather than resort to legislative history or policy considerations, textualists will look to the traditional canons of statutory construction. One of these is the rule of lenity, which indicates that ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.
For instance, in the previous term, the Court (through a plurality opinion authored by Scalia) invoked the rule of lenity as a basis to interpret the federal money-laundering statute narrowly. (I posted on the case, United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008), here.)
But the rule of lenity did not fare so well last term. In its pro-government decisions, the Court’s majorities summarily rejected defendants’ (and dissenters’) arguments that statutes were ambiguous, while the authors of its pro-defendant decisions apparently felt it unnecessary to invoke lenity. This pattern is odd, for each case featured colorable textual arguments on both sides — this would seem good prima facie evidence of ambiguity. However, as the Court explained in Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009):
The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.
One wonders where exactly the line is between simple ambiguity and “grievous ambiguity.” The Court’s opinions provide no clue. Simply put, the ambiguity standard itself suffers from ambiguity. This is, of course, in considerable tension with the whole textualist project, which aimed to bring greater objectivity and determinacy to statutory interpretation than could be provided by intentionalism.