Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Protracted Prosecution, Contrition, and Age as Sentencing Factors

seventh-circuit3The Seventh Circuit had some interesting commentary on a number of different sentencing factors in United States v. Presbitero (Nos. 07-1129, 07-1610, & 07-1712).  Writing for the court, Judge Williams affirmed Presbitero’s conviction of tax offenses, reinstated a codefendant’s conviction, and remanded for resentencing in order to determine whether Presbitero qualified for a leadership enhancement under the sentencing guidelines.  Judge Williams concluded by addressing the government’s arguments that the district court took impermissible factors into account when it sentenced Presbitero to a below-guidelines sentence.

First, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the government that the expense and stress of protracted litigation could not be considered as a mitigating factor for Presbitero.  Since Presbitero spent almost ten years (!) defending charges brought by the government, it is hard to see how anyone could qualify for a sentence reduction based on the burdens of protracted litigation if he does not.  The court cited concerns about encouraging defendants to overspend on expensive lawyers as a reason not to treat litigation costs as a mitigating factor.  There would also be equitable concerns in giving a sentence benefit to defendants who are able to spend a lot of money on private lawyers.  Still, I wonder if the court has given too little regard to the nonfinancial toll of litigation.  In some cases, as Malcolm Feeley famously observed in a book of the same title, “the process is the punishment.”  Although lawyers may make neat distinctions in their heads between the process by which guilt is determined and the punishment imposed afterwards, many defendants surely experience the process as deeply traumatic and stigmatizing in its own right.  In extreme cases, it may not be inappropriate to reduce the length of the formal sentence in recognition of the fact that the defendant has already suffered a great deal prior to the imposition of the sentence. 

Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected the government’s contention that Presbitero’s “obstinate behavior” should have been considered an aggravating factor. 

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Anzivino on the Disappointed Expectations Test

Ralph Anzivino has a new paper on SSRN entitled “The Disappointed Expectations Test and the Economic Loss Doctrine.”  This makes a trilogy of recent articles by Ralph on different aspects of the economic loss doctrine.  (The first two are here and here.)  The abstract for this most recent entry is as follows:

The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created rule that determines whether contract or tort law applies when a defective product causes damage. The doctrine’s starting premise is that contract law governs if the defective product causes economic loss and tort law governs when the defective product causes property damage. A common refrain is that the doctrine was created to prevent contract law from drowning in a sea of tort. However, as the rule has developed, courts have continued to expand contract coverage at the expense of tort coverage. First, when the defective product damages only itself, the courts concluded that such property damage should be resolved under contract law, not tort law. Next, when the defective product damages the system of which it was a component part, the courts concluded that such property damage should also be resolved under contract law, not tort law. Recently, another rule has begun to receive judicial acceptance that further expands the coverage of contract law at the expense of tort law. The rule is called the “disappointed expectations” test or the “reasonably foreseeable” rule. It provides that property damage that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting is recoverable only under contract law, not tort law. The purpose of this Article is to examine the disappointed expectations rule and determine whether it is a positive addition to the legal landscape of the economic loss doctrine.

After surveying the development of the disappointed expectations test, which has been adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Ralph identifies several reasons why the test should be rejected.  He pointedly concludes, “The rule is the most recent progression of tort law drowning in a sea of contract law.”

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What If the Defendant Thought He Was Breaking the Wrong Law?

seventh-circuit2When Doli Pulungan attempted to export 100 military-grade riflescopes to Indonesia in 2007, he knew he was breaking the law.  He was just wrong about which law.  His clients told him there was a ban on military exports to Indonesia, but the ban actually expired in 2005.  Instead, Pulungan violated a different law that requires a license in order to export “defense articles.”  Thus, his elaborate ruse of shipping through Saudi Arabia in order to evade the nonexistent Indonesia embargo did him no good.  A jury ultimately convicted him of “willfully” attempting to violate the export license law, and a judge sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment.

But was his violation truly “willful”?  On appeal, the government conceded that “willfully” means “with knowledge that a license is required,” but argued that the evidence established Pulungan had this knowledge.  The government relied chiefly on Pulungan’s dishonesty with business associates about what he intended to do with the riflescopes and his intent to violate the nonexistent embargo.  But Pulungan’s dishonesty is readily explained by his belief that he was violating the wrong law.  Thus, as the Seventh Circuit saw it in United States v. Pulungan (No. 08-3000), the government was really invoking the doctrine of transferred intent: “As the prosecutor sees things, an intent to violate one law is as good as the intent to violate any other.”  The court, per Chief Judge Easterbrook, was unmoved by this use of the transferred intent doctrine and overturned Pulungan’s conviction. 

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