Life Sentences in Germany

The American penal system is plagued by a lack of coherent purposes and clear institutional accountability.  If we were interested in a model for how to do things better, Germany might be a good candidate.  I’m no expert on the German system, but I’ve just read with great interest a new paper on the way that Germany manages its life sentences.  The paper, authored by Dirk van Zyl Smit and entitled “Release From Life Imprisonment: A Comparative Note on the Role of Pre-Release Decision Making in England and Germany,” appears as a chapter in Fervet Opus: Liber Amicorum Anton van Kalmthout (Marc Groenhuijsen et al. eds., 2010).

Although the paper particularly focuses on a fascinating 2009 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court, it also provides some useful background information on the the legal framework for life sentences in Germany.  Here are some features that stand out for me.  

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The New Miranda Warning

I never thought the Miranda warning was all that useful.  In fact, it actually raises more questions than it answers.  For example, the warning tells a suspect that anything he says can be used against him in court.  But asking for an attorney is saying something, isn’t it?  Could the prosecutor later use such a request against him?  (After all, television teaches us that only guilty people “lawyer-up.”)  And what if the suspect wants to remain silent?  Could his silence be used against him in court?  The Miranda warning fails to answer these and many other questions.

 Making matters even worse for the would-be defendant is Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).  In a confidence inspiring 5-4 split, the Court ruled that a suspect cannot actually exercise the right to remain silent by remaining silent—even if that silence lasts through nearly three hours of interrogation.

 In response to all of this chaos, I’ve drafted a new and improved Miranda warning.

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Deterring Constitutional Violations

Consider a case of police misconduct:  An officer wants to enter and search a citizen’s home, but has no search warrant, no legal basis to obtain one, and no exigent circumstances to justify entry.  The officer enters and searches anyway and, as he suspects, finds contraband.  The citizen-turned-criminal-defendant then moves the court for a remedy: suppression of the evidence.

Should the evidence be suppressed?  In Herring v. United States, our Supreme Court held that suppression is not an individual right, but rather a last resort.  That is, even given a clear constitutional violation, a trial court should suppress evidence only in the rare case of egregious police misconduct, where suppression would deter the misconduct in the future.

Deterrence in this context, however, is an illusion.

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