Client Fraud and the Lawyer

 

As the disaster in the financial markets continues to unfold, greed and avarice – the usual suspects – are being overshadowed by pervasive fraud as a prime mover.  We have, of course, the infamous Bernie Madoff and now the “mini-Madoffs” upon whom we can heap large helpings of blame, but deceit, misrepresentations, and fraud seemingly resonate throughout the markets, as illustrated by the subprime scandal, the mortgage mess, and the flood of worthless consumer debt.  And what was the role of lawyers in all this?  Financial transactions of this sort inevitably involve lawyers at some stage.  Investigations and lawsuits may soon give us a clearer picture of the role lawyers may have played in exacerbating the nightmare, but the question for today is whether lawyers could have, or should have, acted to prevent any of this.  And my focus is not Sarbanes-Oxley or securities regulations, but on the fundamentals of lawyers’ professional responsibility.

Lawyers are not permitted to “assist” or “further” crimes or frauds committed by their clients.  To do so – provided anyone finds out – eviscerates the venerable lawyer-client privilege and exposes both lawyer and client to civil and criminal remedies. This is comfortably familiar and uncontroversial.  But what of the lawyer who is aware of a client’s fraud but who arguably has done nothing to assist or further it?  Assume further that the fraud is on-going and not a past act.  What is the lawyer’s duty or professional responsibility, especially considering that lawyers are enjoined not to disclose client confidences or privileged communications without client consent (and the reality is that few clients will approve of their lawyer’s whistle-blowing)?

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Faculty Workshop on Criminal Procedure in Russia

Yesterday, our colleague Professor Olga Semukhina of the Marquette Department of Social and Cultural Sciences gave a presentation entitled Criminal Procedure in Modern Russia: The Path of Reforms as part of our faculty workshop series. She outlined the structure of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code (adopted in 2002), explained how the criminal process works, and offered her sense of the system’s shortcomings. Not surprisingly, the system looks very different from that in the United States. The Russian system has Continental roots, and consistent with that is considerably less adversarial than our own. Indeed, defense lawyers play an almost entirely reactive role. The defense has no ability to gather evidence, and until trial (which is the only adversarial component of the system) is limited to lodging objections to the work of the criminal investigator (a lawyer who is in theory an independent investigator, but whose physical location amongst the police and prosecutors tends to generate an affinity for the state). Plea bargaining is non-existent. Every case goes to trial, and 99 percent of those result in convictions.

For me, the presentation underscored the value of the comparative perspective. It is easy to conflate familiarity with necessity, and exposure to the workings of another system has the tendency to dislodge some of our assumptions about the way the world works. Another example: in Russia, a crime victim’s claim for restitution is part of the same case as the criminal prosecution, and the victim has a right to appeal the verdict in the criminal portion of the appeal. It’s an intriguing process to someone, like me, who is interested in the boundaries between the civil and criminal processes.

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Seventh Circuit Week in Review: Prior Crimes Evidence, Career Offender Guideline, and More

The Seventh Circuit had four new opinions in criminal cases last week.  In United States v. Millbrook (No. 07-2931), the court (per Judge Rovner) affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence for drug trafficking and other offenses.  The defendant’s appeal raised several issues, the most interesting of which was yet another Rule 404(b) question regarding the use of prior crimes evidence.  I have blogged about several of these cases recently, criticizing the Seventh Circuit’s deference to poorly justified decisions by district court judges to admit highly prejudicial prior crimes evidence.  In Millbrook, the court once again affirmed, albeit with a caution that the case was “at the outer limits of what is permissible under Rule 404(b).”

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