Criminal Law & Process – Page 171 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Privacy Interests in Extremis

Post author:Michael K. McChrystal
Post published:September 13, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Privacy Rights Wisconsin Court System Wisconsin Criminal Law & Process

In a fascinating case decided this week, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of a video recording apparently showing a husband having sexual intercourse with his wife, a stroke victim who was unconscious and lived in a nursing home. See State v. Johnson (Appeal No. 2007AP1485-CR, 9/11/2008). The husband was charged with second degree sexual assault, a class C felony, which can result in imprisonment up to 40 years. The offense occurs when a defendant “has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the defendant knows is unconscious.” Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(d). The statute further provides that “A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating this section because of marriage to the complainant.” Wis. Stat. § 940.225(6).

Should Criminal Law Be Used to Enforce Family Responsibilities?

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 12, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Family Law Legal Scholarship

This important question is explored in a forthcoming mini-symposium in the Boston University Law Review. The lead article, written by Professors Jennifer Collins, Ethan Leib, and Dan Markel, argues that if criminal law is going to be used to enforce the responsibilities of family members to one another, then there also ought to be ways for people in other types of caregiving relationships to make their responsibilities criminally enforceable.

Supreme Court Raises Doubts About the Money-Laundering Trap

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 10, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process U.S. Supreme Court

The federal money-laundering statute prohibits both the concealment of proceeds from crime and the use of such proceeds to promote illegal activities. While designed primarily with drug kingpins in mind, the statute’s broad language can easily become a trap for low-level criminals doing fairly routine things. (I posted recently on a good example of an aggressive use of the money-laundering statute.) Expansive readings of the statute mean that the penalties attached by Congress to many predicate offenses become meaningless, as nearly everyone becomes subject to the twenty-year maximum prison term triggered by a money-laundering conviction. Responding to this concern, the Supreme Court recently adopted narrow constructions of the money-laundering statute in two cases, United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008), and Cuellar v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 1994 (2008). The cases may point the way towards a more discriminating money-laundering jurisprudence that attempts to reserve the harsh penalties of the statute for the most deserving defendants.