As reported by California Case Law (via a tip by friend of the blog, Jack Sargent), the imponderable case of Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., No. A121651 (Cal. App. Ct. October 8, 2009):
In plaintiff’s race and employment discrimination lawsuit against United Airlines, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants is reversed as to eight causes of action as they must be decided by the jury. Furthermore, the trial court’s order sustaining 763 of 764 of defendant’s objections was a manifest abuse of discretion.
I can only do this case justice by stating precisely some of the court’s decision. This is all takes place in the context of a rather ordinary race discrimination in employment claim:
At the same time, the summary judgment procedure has become the target of criticism on a number of fronts. Some particular criticism is directed to the procedure in employment litigation, including that it is being abused, especially by deep pocket defendants to overwhelm less well‑funded litigants. More significantly, it has been said that courts are sometimes making determinations properly reserved for the factfinder, sometimes drawing inferences in the employer’s favor, sometimes requiring the employees to essentially prove their case at the summary judgment stage. Here we confront the poster child for such criticism, in a case involving what may well be the most oppressive motion ever presented to a superior court . . . .