A Chemistry Lesson from the Seventh Circuit

seventh-circuit51Under the federal sentencing guidelines, sentences in drug-trafficking cases turn largely on weight — that is, how much of each type of drug was sold by the defendant — which can cause all sorts of problems in sentencing long-time dealers who were not considerate enough to keep meticulous records of their sales for the police.  Witness the case of crack dealer Joshua Hines, who admitted acquiring 1.531 kilograms of powder cocaine.  The district judge assumed that Hines cooked this powder into an equivalent weight of crack for resale, which resulted in a sentence of 168 months in prison.  Given much harsher treatment of crack than powder, the guidelines would not have resulted in nearly so long a sentence on the basis of the 1.531 kg of powder alone.  So, is it fair to assume that a crack dealer who possessed a certain weight of powder also possessed the same weight of crack?

No, said the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hines (No. 08-3255).  Writing for the court, Judge Posner offered a little chemistry lesson, explaining that the process of cooking powder into crack removes hydrochloride from the drug.  Under ideal conditions, cooking results in an eleven-percent weight loss.  But, given the potential for careless waste during cooking, it is not clear that even the eleven-percent loss should be assumed.  The court concluded, “[If] the government wants the sentencing judge to infer the weight of the crack from the weight of the powder from which the crack was manufactured, it has to present evidence, concerning the cooking process, that would enable a conversion ratio to be estimated” (3).  (Judging by the mess on my kitchen counter most mornings, I am guessing that the “conversion ratio” when my six-year-old cooks oatmeal into hot cereal is about 2:1.  Fortunately, and notwithstanding its cholesterol-lowering benefits, the street value of oatmeal remains a lot less than cocaine.)

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Seventh Circuit Weighs in on Bankruptcy Fraud

seventh-circuit51In the wake of a surge in bankruptcies, can a boom in bankruptcy fraud prosecutions be far behind?  If so, district court judges will benefit from the Seventh Circuit’s opinion today in United States v. Peel (No. 07-3933), which addressed a number of unsettled legal questions.

The facts in Peel were unusually lurid for a bankruptcy case.  Back in the 1970’s, Peel had an affair with his wife’s sixteen-year-old sister.  Although the affair ended after a few months, Peel kept several nude pictures of the sister.  Some time later, Peel was divorced from his wife, and bankruptcy followed.  Peel’s largest financial obligation was to his ex-wife: $230,000 plus an additional $2500 per month for the rest of his life, pursuant to the terms of the divorce settlement.  The ex-wife filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings in order to ensure that these obligations were not discharged.  Peel then attempted to pressure her into dropping the claim by threatening to release the nude pictures of her sister.  The ex-wife complained to police, and Peel was eventually convicted of bankruptcy fraud, obstruction of justice, and possession of child pornography.

Judge Posner, writing for the court, addressed several issues relating to Peel’s convictions and sentence. 

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Seventh Circuit Decides That Reckless Injury and Statutory Rape Are Not “Crimes of Violence”

seventh-circuit51In a series of posts (e.g., here and here), I have been tracking the fallout in the Seventh Circuit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008).  Begay adopted a new approach for deciding when former convictions count as “crimes of violence” that trigger the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Earlier this week, the Seventh Circuit had another in its increasingly long line of post-Begay decisions holding that this or that specific offense does not fit the new definition of “crime of violence.”  More specifically, in United States v. McDonald (No. 08-2703) (Sykes, J.), the court held that first-degree reckless injury (in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.23) and second-degree sexual assault of a child (what would be colloquially called “statutory rape,” in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2)) do not count as crimes of violence. 

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