Seventh Circuit Weighs in on Aggravated Identity Theft Sentencing

The aggravated identity theft statute (18 U.S.C. §1028A) specifies a sentence of two years — no more, no less — for each violation.  So, when a defendant is convicted of multiple violations of the statute, should the two-year sentences be imposed concurrently or consecutively?  Today, in United States v. Dooley (No. 11-2256), the Seventh Circuit recognized that the sentencing judge has discretion in making the decision, but held that the judge must consider the factors set forth in U.S.S.G. §5G1.2 Application Note 2(B).

Dooley was convicted in three separate counts of violating §1028A, leaving the judge to choose among three sentencing options: 24 months, 48 months, or 72 months.  (I leave out the effect of Dooley’s conviction of various other offenses, which did not play a significant role in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.)  In selecting the 72-month option, the judge focused on the need to avoid disparities relative to another defendant.  However, the judge did not mention the Note 2(B) factors.  This, the Seventh Circuit held, was plain error.  

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Who Is a “Supervisor”? We Know One When We See One

Justice Potter Stewart famously eschewed a formal legal definition of pornography, and instead embraced the “I know it when I see it” test. Based on his opinion yesterday in United States v. Figueroa (No. 11-2594), Judge Posner seems to have a similar approach in mind for determining whether a drug trafficker is a “manager” or “supervisor.”

Under § 3B1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines, a manager or supervisor of criminal activity receives a substantial sentence enhancement. An even larger enhancement is contemplated for some defendants who qualify as a “leader” or “organizer.” The guidelines suggest a seven-factor test for determining whether a defendant is a leader or organizer, but are silent on the meaning of manager and supervisor. However, in the Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, it has been common for courts also to look to the seven factors when making manager/supervisor determinations.

Writing for the panel in Figueroa, Judge Posner seemed to scoff at this approach: 

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Setser v. United States: Bureaucratic Sentencing on Trial in the Supreme Court, Again

While he was already on probation for another offense, Monroe Setser was arrested for trafficking in meth.  The arrest led to three separate criminal proceedings: a revocation of Setser’s probation in state court and fresh prosecutions in both state and federal court.  (One wonders why our law-enforcement authorities have nothing better to do with their time than pile on the charges in these sorts of redundant prosecutions.  Oh, to overturn the Supreme Court’s regrettable decision in Bartkus v. Illinois!)  The federal prosecution reached the sentencing stage first, and the district court decided that it should rule on whether the 151-month federal sentence should be served consecutively to or concurrently with the anticipated state sentences.  The court split the difference, determining that the federal sentence would be consecutive to the sentence for the probation violation, but concurrent with the sentence for the fresh state charge.  Then — wouldn’t you know it! — the state court made the federal sentence a logical impossibility by ordering the two state sentences to run concurrently with one another.

On appeal, Setser argued unsuccessfully that the district court lacked authority to make a concurrent/consecutive decision relative to a state sentence that had not yet been imposed.  In Setser’s view, it was up to the Bureau of Prisons to make the call, based on its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to decide whether federal sentences are to be served in a state or federal facility.  The Fifth Circuit rejected this view, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in a 6-3 decision earlier this spring.

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