McCormick on the Persistence of Ex Parte Young

The faculty at Marquette Law School welcomed Professor Marcia McCormick of the Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law to a faculty workshop this past Tuesday.  Professor McCormick, who focuses on the law of federal courts and employment discrimination, among other areas, discussed her new paper on the persistence of the case of Ex Parte Young in the face of the Federalism Revolution of the last two decades or so.

In her presentation, Professor McCormcick described the large number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the last twenty-five years that have touched on the relationship between the federal government and the states. In this time, the Court seems to have substantially limited the power of the federal government and expanded that of the states, as many Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment cases suggest.

She also maintained that despite what were seen by many to be revolutionary shifts, two doctrines that provide great power to the federal government seem to have survived so far with little or no change: Congress’ power under the Spending Clause to require states to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain conduct; and the federal courts’ power under Ex Parte Young to hear suits by private parties to force state officials to follow federal law, including laws created under the Spending Clause. The combination of these two doctrines provides for quite a bit of federal power, she argued, and it is the extent of that power which makes the continued survival of the doctrines so surprising.

Professor McCormick then explored the extent of power the federal courts and Congress can exercise over the states through the use of those combined doctrines and suggested some reasons the Court has not removed that power.  In this vein, she argued that it was likely that the Court sees this limited federal power as a necessary check on the states to ensure the supremacy of federal law, to maximize the efficient use of both federal and state power, and to maximize accountability and the rule of law for both the states and federal government.

A lively question and answer session followed Professor McCormick’s talk.   I have it on good authority that Professor McCormick’s favorite culinary adventure involved Kopp’s Custard in Greenfield.

Continue ReadingMcCormick on the Persistence of Ex Parte Young

Seventh Circuit Week in Review: Terrible Tragedy=Maximum Sentence?

The Seventh Circuit had four new opinions in criminal cases last week.  The court did not break new ground in any of them, but one raises some interesting sentencing issues.  I’ll first discuss that case, United States v. Wise (No. 08-2794)and then briefly summarize the other three, which dealt with the definition of “crack cocaine,” disparity in the sentencing of codefendants, and the constitutionality of a gun possession statute, respectively.

First, the Wise case arose out of terrible tragedy.  Wise left a loaded firearm on a window ledge in his girlfrend’s apartment, where it could be reached by children.  You can already guess where this is headed: a four-year old left unattended in the room for a few minutes picked up the gun, the gun discharged, and a two-year old was killed.  Wise was charged in Illinois state court with reckless endangerment of a child resulting in the child’s death.  Wise, however, was a felon, and so his possession of the firearm was a federal crime, too.  State charges were apparently dropped, as federal prosecutors charged Wise with the gun possession crime.  Wise pled guilty.  The sentencing judge decided to sentence Wise above the recommended sentencing guidelines range and give Wise the maximum, ten years.  Wise challenged his sentence on appeal, and the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Evans) affirmed. 

Continue ReadingSeventh Circuit Week in Review: Terrible Tragedy=Maximum Sentence?

Failures of Refugee Law and the Inhumane Prospect of Deporting Settled Liberians from the United States

This semester I am teaching a seminar entitled Comparative Refugee and Asylum Law, and last week, one of my students in that course, Vintee Sawnhey, sent me a link to a news article about the thousands of Liberians who fear deportation from the United States because the “deferred enforced departure” status that President Bush extended to them in September 2007 is scheduled to end on March 31, 2009.  

I should probably preface the rest of this long post by explaining that the article Vintee sent me was especially interesting to me because I worked with many Liberians during and just after law school, at Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, now called The Advocates for Human Rights.  Most of my work for that organization involved interviewing prospective asylum-seekers, to assess their credibility and the strength of their claims for asylum.  My work there happened from late 1996 through early 1999, and many of our clients were Liberians.  Minnesota has a relatively large population of Liberians.  (You may want to check out the Minnesota Star-Tribune’s really nice website about Liberians in Minnesota.)

Anyway, as Vintee pointed out, the situation of these Liberians is “pretty relevant to some of our current readings” in my asylum law seminar. Indeed, the situation of the Liberians facing possible deportation later this year illustrates two of the most important ideas in the course:  (1) the legal definition of “refugee” does not include people fleeing from generalized civil war conditions, and (2) offering “temporary” humanitarian protection in place of permanent refugee status to such individuals is problematic, because countries experiencing civil war do not become stable very quickly, and human beings build new lives in the meantime.

Continue ReadingFailures of Refugee Law and the Inhumane Prospect of Deporting Settled Liberians from the United States