DOJ Changes Its Mind, Seventh Circuit Does Not

As I discussed in this post, the Seventh Circuit earlier this year rejected retroactivity for the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which softened the mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine offenses.  In the Seventh Circuit’s view, any crack offenses committed prior to August 3, 2010, when the FSA was signed into law, must still be sentenced under the harsh pre-FSA system.  Given the lag time between the commission of an offense and the conviction and sentencing of the offender, district judges in the Seventh Circuit are even now probably still imposing sentences that Congress has declared to be unfair.

The Seventh Circuit’s position followed that of the Department of Justice.  However, since the initial retroactivity ruling, DOJ has changed its position and now supports partial retroactivity.  Additionally, three other circuits have since rejected the Seventh Circuit’s position.  In light of these developments, one of the Seventh Circuit judges proposed that the initial ruling be reconsidered en banc.  Last week, however, the court announced that the initial ruling would stand.

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Seventh Circuit Rejects Retroactivity for Padilla

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), the Supreme Court held that a lawyer provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform a client of the deportation risks that result from a guilty plea.  However, the Court did not clearly indicate whether its holding must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, leaving the lower courts to sort out the mess.  A handful of district courts have already split on this issue.  Now, with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling last week in Chaidez v. United States (No. 10-3623), the circuits are also split.  A divided panel in Chaidez rejected both retroactivity and the Third Circuit’s reasoning to the contrary in United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).

As the Chaidez majority observed, the key legal issue is whether Padilla announced a new rule, or merely provided an application of the established principles of ineffective assistance from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a new rule may not be applied retroactively unless it falls into one of two exceptions that plainly do not encompass the Padilla holding.

Teague and least some of its progeny suggest what seems effectively a strong presumption in favor of a “new rule” finding (and hence against retroactivity).  Here is how the Chaidez majority characterized the law:

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Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection as Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A defendant’s right to reasonably competent legal representation is violated when the defendant’s lawyer discriminates on the basis of gender during jury selection, the Seventh Circuit ruled last week inWinston v. Boatwright (No. 10-1156).  The court’s reasoning would presumably apply equally to racial discrimination.  However, because of the peculiarities of federal habeas law, the particular defendant who presented the claim in Winston was unable to obtain any relief.

Here’s what happened.  Winston was charged with sexual assault of a fifteen-year-old girl and convicted by an all-woman jury.  His lawyer had used his seven peremptory strikes to remove six men and one woman from the jury.  As Winston’s post-conviction counsel later discovered, the trial lawyer struck the male jurors because he thought that females would be more critical of the victim.

Apart from the fact that such gender discrimination is illegal, trial counsel’s strategy may actually have been a good one.  Indeed, the jury acquitted Winston of an intercourse charge.

No matter, the Seventh Circuit ruled.  Competent counsel (in the constitutional sense) does not discriminate against men in the exercise of peremptory strikes.  Period.

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