The Wages of Speech

thumbnailCAJKLY1BApparently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not the only one sharply divided on an array of issues and fighting over questions of recusal. In Michigan, the Supreme Court voted 4-3 to require that individual justices who have denied a motion to recuse themselves explain the reason in writing and to permit the Court to overrule the refusal to step aside. A Detroit Free Press columnist says that the Michigan court has been characterized by “back-biting, name-calling and playground-level cruelty” and adoption of the rule did draw sharply worded dissents. Sound familar?

Locally, there appears to be a concerted effort (spurred, in part, by an internal memo circulated within the State Public Defender’s office) to seek the recusal of Justice Michael Gableman in a number of criminal cases because he has allegedly expressed a general bias against criminal defendants. Justice Gableman has refused to step aside (the rationale for the motions would apply in every criminal case), and it is unclear whether the Court can compel him to do so.

I think the controversy raises some interesting questions about the interaction between campaign speech and recusal. I am writing a paper on the topic and thought I’d test drive a few of the arguments here as applied to our local controversy.

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Memo To The New Justices: That’s Not How We Do Things On The Court

wisconsin-supreme-courtAt last month’s Conference on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the panel discussing the Court’s business law cases during the 2008-2009 term began with an observation and a question.  The panel noted that there were three business law cases in which the votes of the Justices split on a 5-2 basis.  These cases were Farmer’s Automobile Ins. Assn. v. Union Pacific Ry., 2009 WI 73; Krier v. Vilione, 2009 WI 45; and Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76.  The question our panel asked was “Is this 5-2 split just a coincidence, or is something else going on?”

I cannot speak for my co-panelists, Tom Shriner and Leonard Leverson, and these comments should not be interpreted to reflect their views.  However, I have concluded that, taken together, the three dissents filed by Justices Abrahamson and Bradley in the aforementioned cases can be read as an clear admonishment to their two newest colleagues on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

 The message that comes through to me, loud and clear, is one of disapproval of Justices Ziegler and Gableman for failing to adhere to the unwritten standards of professionalism that apply to the highest court in the State.  It’s as if these two members of the “old guard” feel it necessary to remind their colleagues that they now sit on a Supreme Court, and that there are certain things that one just doesn’t do as a Supreme Court Justice.  That the concerns of the dissenters have arisen in the context of three cases involving business law disputes is nothing more than a coincidence.

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Sentences Merit Closer Scrutiny by Appellate Courts

I have a new article on SSRN entitled “Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference.”  As the title suggests, I review the standard arguments in favor of the prevailing rubber-stamp approach to appellate review of sentences, and I conclude that the arguments are something short of compelling.  Here is the abstract:

American appellate courts have long resisted calls that they play a more robust role in the sentencing process, insisting that they must defer to what they characterize as the superior sentencing competence of trial judges. This position is unfortunate insofar as rigorous appellate review might advance uniformity and other rule-of-law values that are threatened by broad trial-court discretion. This Article thus provides the first systematic critique of the appellate courts’ standard justifications for deferring to trial-court sentencing decisions. For instance, these justifications are shown to be based on premises that are inconsistent with empirical research on cognition and decision-making. Despite the shortcomings of the standard justifications, the Article suggests that there is a stronger argument for deference that is based on the trial judge’s background knowledge regarding the particular circumstances of the local community and courthouse. Even the potential benefits of localization, though, do not clearly outweigh the rule-of-law costs of appellate deference. Thus, the Article concludes with a proposal for a sliding-scale approach to deference that strengthens the appellate role, but also accommodates localization values in the cases in which they are most salient.

The article will appear in the William & Mary Law Review in 2010.

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