Knowledge, Intent, and Knowledge of Someone Else’s Intent

As yesterday’s post explained, contributory copyright liability emerged in the nineteenth century, but was not given a determinative test until 1970, in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. Under that test, a secondary actor could be held contributorily liable for someone else’s infringement if the actor had knowledge of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it.

That test was difficult enough to apply consistently on its own. But in 2005, the Supreme Court threw a further monkey wrench into the works when it resurrected Gershwin’s use of the term “inducement.” In a case involving the distribution of filesharing software to a group largely consisting of infringers, the Court stated the test for contributory liability as follows:

One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (C.A.2 1971)…. [T]hese doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, [Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.,] at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, supra, at 1162; 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 12.04[A] (2005).

MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005).

For the past two decades it’s been unclear what the Grokster Court meant to do here. Was it reformulating the traditional test for contributory infringement to focus only on intentional inducement, rather than knowledge and material contribution? If so, then why the unqualified citations to Gershwin? If not, did this passage just add inducement as an additional form of indirect liability, or did it change Gershwin somehow?

Lower courts, for the most part, read Grokster the last way—inducement was not a complete substitution for the traditional material contribution test, but the traditional test didn’t come through unscathed either. If Grokster was just resurrecting “inducement” as a way of satisfying the second element of Gershwin, then why does Grokster talk about intent? There’s no mention of intent in Gershwin, only knowledge. If Grokster instead intended to add a third form of indirect liability to copyright law, why does the Court call it “contributor[y]” infringement?

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Jury Awards $242 Million in First Verdict Against Tesla

Post-accident photo of the Tesla in Benavides case

The jury trial I wrote about several weeks ago has come to a conclusion, with the jury finding Tesla liable in the death of Naibel Benavides Leon. Notably, the jury concluded that the driver, George McGee, was 67% responsible for the crash, while Tesla was 33% responsible. Nonetheless, Tesla will be required (pursuant to a judgment entered yesterday) to pay more than $42 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages.

The verdict may not survive appeal or may be reduced. Still, the result is a major vindication of the plaintiff’s theory of defect against Tesla, and ought to put the company on notice that its “blame the driver” litigation strategy may not hold water with juries.

Tesla was able to demonstrate at trial that the driver’s distraction was a significant factor in this case (in the language of 1L torts, a but-for cause). McGee dropped his cellphone and was looking for it on the floor of his car when he ran a stop sign at 65 miles per hour and crashed into a parked Chevy Tahoe. Tesla sought to pin blame for the crash on him, arguing that no level 2 driver assistance system could have prevented it. To some extent this worked, as shown by the jury’s finding that McGee was 67% responsible for the incident (he was not a defendant in the case, having previously settled plaintiffs’ separate case against him).

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Tesla to Face Jury Trial over Autopilot Defects Following 70-Page Summary Judgment Opinion

Tesla’s “Autopilot” has been implicated in over a dozen deaths in the U.S. alone, and yet the company has yet to face a significant finding of liability in a litigated case. That may end soon, as trial is set to begin in federal court today following a blockbuster summary judgment opinion issued only a few weeks ago.

Benavides v. Tesla involves a crash that occurred on a two-lane county road in Key Largo, Florida in 2019. George McGee was driving his Tesla Model S from his office in Boca Raton to his home, a distance of around 100 miles, when he ran through a stop sign at a T-intersection and collided with a Chevy Tahoe that was parked on the far side of the road at around 60 miles per hour. Naibel Benavides, a 22-year-old college student, was standing next to the Tahoe and was killed. Her friend Dillon Angulo—the two were on a date—was severely injured and is also a plaintiff in the case.

The Benavides crash implicates many of the same issues raised by other fatal crashes involving Autopilot. The system, despite its name, is a “driver assistance system” that requires constant oversight by an attentive driver, far short of what most people think of when they imagine an autonomous vehicle. Nor is it capable of functioning in any environment; the instructions explicitly warn drivers not to use it on anything less than a divided, limited-access highway, one without stop signs or crossing traffic.

Because of these limitations, every fatal Autopilot crash has involved a distracted driver. In the Huang case, for example, the plaintiff was killed when his car collided with a concrete barrier on the highway while he played a game on his phone (that case was settled for an undisclosed sum on the eve of trial). The Benavides crash is no different: McGee, the driver, testified in his deposition that he was on the phone with American Airlines trying to book a flight across the country when he dropped his phone and bent down to the floor to pick it up. It was at that moment that he sped through the stop sign and into the parked Chevy. (Benavides filed suit against McGee as well; that suit was settled for an undisclosed sum). McGee also used Autopilot on an inappropriate road, manually accelerated to a speed of 62 miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was 45, and repeatedly triggered Autopilot’s warning system for driver inattention.

Unsurprisingly given the facts outlined above, Tesla’s strategy in these cases has been to cast blame on the driver. At times this has been successful. The first trial involving a fatal crash linked to Autopilot involved a plaintiff-driver who had been drinking, and the jury had no trouble concluding that Tesla bore no blame for the accident. In Benavides, for the first time, the victim is a third party. Still, Tesla argued, it was the driver who was to blame for the crash, not Autopilot.

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