The One-Month Anniversary of Arizona v. Gant: A Sign of Things to Come

Although we have not yet seen the flurry of end-of-term opinions sure to emerge from the Supreme Court in June, few are likely to gain as much immediate attention as Arizona v. Gant, in which the Court imposed new Fourth Amendment limitations on the ability of police officers to search vehicles.  The CrimProf listserve has been buzzing about Gant since the opinion came out, and now we are beginning to see the first signs of fallout in the lower courts.  Rising 3L Brent Simerson sent me the following insightful comments about the significance of Gant, for which I am grateful:

As one might expect, the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arizona v. Gant has triggered changes in the way police officers and attorneys must analyze warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest in the vehicle context.  Professor Jon Deitrich provided several interesting observations about the opinion itself in a post last week.  The Court held that police officers may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”  This holding narrowed the Court’s prior holdings in Chimel v. California and New York v. Belton, which were largely interpreted by lower courts as permitting vehicular searches incident to a lawful arrest regardless of how improbable it was that the arrestee could access the automobile.  Gant will undoubtedly constrict law enforcement’s hitherto broad authority to search vehicles incident to lawful arrest, see United States v. Majette, No. 08-4427, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (conviction vacated pursuant to Gant), but it is too soon to describe how courts will answer tough questions presented by Gant‘s requirements: What constitutes a “secured” arrestee?  May police officers circumscribe the spirit of Gant by directing the unsecured arrestee to remain within reaching distance of the passenger compartments?  These fact-sensitive questions will take time to resolve.

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Teaching E-Negotiation

Andrea Schneider has an interesting new paper on SSRN entitled “You’ve Got Agreement: Negoti@ting via Email.”  Andrea and her coauthors explore what is different about negotiating by email, as opposed to in person, and discuss how teachers of negotiation might better prepare students for the practice of e-negotiation.  (Andrea discussed her personal experiences with email negotiation in the classroom in an earlier post.)  This seems to me an important topic.  I do as much of my negotiating as possible by email, which I prefer so that I can take greater care with the words I use and so that I have a reliable record afterwards of who said what.  I suspect many other negotiators feel the same way.

The paper appears in print as a chapter in the book Rethinking Negotiation Teaching: Innovations for Context and Culture.  I look forward to a follow-up on negotiation by texting.

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Should Courts Enforce Contracts Induced by Lying?

The most recent issue of the Marquette Law Review includes a provocative article written by Professor Allen Blair of Hamline University Law School on contracts and fraud (92 Marq. L. Rev. 423).  In the article, Professor Blair explores why courts tend to not enforce so called “no reliance” clauses in contracts, clauses in which one party disclaims any liability for fraudulent statements (which includes lies) made outside of the four corners of the contract.

According to Professor Blair, courts generally refuse to enforce no-reliance clauses on the grounds that it violates public policy to protect a person against his own fraud.  While some courts have enforced no-reliance clauses, they have generally done so only after finding that the clauses were specifically negotiated, and only to the extent that they set out the precise representation on which the other party may not rely.  Only a handful of courts have upheld no-reliance clauses without attaching these types of limitations.

While Professor Blair does not promote blind enforcement of all no-reliance clauses, he argues that courts should not ignore the numerous legitimate reasons why sophisticated parties in complex transactions might agree to a no-reliance clause. 

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