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After the issuance of a particularly fractured decision, featuring multiple concurrences and dissents, former Chief Justice Rehnquist once quipped, “I didn’t know we had that many people on our Court.”  The quote came to mind after reading a recent Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Gant, in which Justice Scalia did something rather unusual and, from the perspective of those tasked with application of the Court’s often splintered decisions, laudatory.  He provided the fifth vote needed to produce a majority opinion, despite the fact that he did not entirely agree with the opinion he joined.

In Gant, the Court addressed the scope of the “search-incident-to-arrest” exception to the warrant requirement established in Chimel v. California.  In Chimel, the Court held that police may, incident to an arrest, search the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, i.e., the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.  In New York v. Belton, the Court extended the rule, holding that police may also search the passenger compartment of the vehicle from which an arrestee was taken.  Most lower courts understood Belton to permit a vehicle search incident to arrest even when there was no real possibility that the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.  Some courts even allowed a search under Belton when the handcuffed arrestee had already left the scene.

Gant presented an opportunity to narrow this construction of the Belton rule.  

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More Advice for Online Contact

Following up on my post regarding email negotiation last week, the ABA Journal noted this week that there are limits on the use of social spaces in order to gather information:

A lawyer who wants to see what a potential witness says to personal contacts on his or her Facebook or MySpace page has one good option, a recent ethics opinion suggests: Ask for access.

Alternative approaches, such as secretly sending a third party to “friend” a Facebook user, are unethical because they are deceptive, says the Philadelphia Bar Association in a March advisory opinion.

Not telling the potential witness of the third party’s affiliation with the lawyer “omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness’s pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness,” the opinion explains.

“The omission would purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow access, when she [might] not do so if she knew the third person was associated with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access was to obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.”

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Tribe on the Use of Foreign Law

In an earlier post, I outlined the basic themes of Laurence Tribe’s The Invisible Constitution.  One specific section that was of particular interest to me was Tribe’s defense of the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.  I run into this controversial practice every spring when I teach Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 51 (2005).  Interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Atkins banned execution of the mentally retarded, while Roper outlawed the death penalty for juvenile defendants.  In both cases, the majority drew intense criticism for citing foreign law in support of its holding.

Based on Atkins and Roper anyway — I am admittedly not as familiar with some of the Court’s other uses of foreign law — I think that Tribe is right about at least two things.

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