Using Indictment as a Negotiation Tactic

Earlier this month, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, for crimes against humanity and war crimes connected with Darfur. The warrant raises again the timeless question of peace versus justice. (See articles by Marquette visiting professor Lisa Laplante on outlawing amnesty and me on balancing peace versus justice in negotiating peace.) Is it more important to have peace on the ground (or at least hope for it) or to attain justice (in the manner of prosecutions)? Darfur presents this issue in a quite pressing manner.

Last summer, among much hand-wringing that the indictment would only make it more difficult for peace to be negotiated, Judge Richard Goldstone wrote a top-notch op-ed for the New York Times explaining the fallacy of that concern. Goldstone, as the former prosecutor for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, understands this balance between peace and justice quite well. As Goldstone notes, the peace process in Darfur is hardly working as it is.

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Sports Paternalism

Matt Mitten has an interesting new paper on SSRN entitled (this is a mouthful!) “Student-Eligibility Rules Limiting Athletic Performance or Prohibiting Athletic Participation for Health Reasons Despite Medical Uncertainty: Legal and Ethical Considerations.”  The paper discusses two policy problems in intercollegiate athletics that both turn on how much paternalism is appropriate in preventing student-athletes from doing things that may ultimately prove harmful to themselves. 

The first problem is use of steroids.  Although performance enhancing drugs are often condemned for giving some athletes an unfair advantage, Matt suggests that unfair advantages are an unavoidable feature of intercollegiate athletics, noting, for instance, disparities in coaching and training facilities.  Moreover, after reviewing the medical evidence, Matt concludes that “currently there are no definitive scientific or epidemiological studies evidencing that a healthy adult’s usage of anabolic steroids in appropriate dosages necessarily will have life-threatening or long-term serious health effects.”  But, of course, the absence of conclusive evidence of danger does not mean that steroids are safe.  Given uncertainty, the question is whether athletes should be permitted to decide for themselves whether to bear the risk.

The second problem is participation by student-athletes suffering from a medical condition (e.g., a spinal or cardiovascular abnormality) that may give rise to increased risks of serious or life-threatening injury.  Again, the question is one of paternalism in the face of medical uncertainty: should the athlete himself or herself be given the right to decide whether to bear the risks?  As with the steroid issue, Matt ultimately concludes that the NCAA and individual universities have “valid legal and ethical authority” to protect student-athletes from themselves.

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Seventh Circuit Week in Review: Can a Defendant Waive the Right to an Impartial Jury?

The Seventh Circuit had three new opinions in criminal cases in the past week.  The court also withdrew, without explanation, its opinion in United States v. Dunson (No. 08-1691), which I blogged about last week.

In United States v. Brazelton (No. 07-2488), the defendant was convicted by a jury of various drug and gun offenses.  The jury included the second cousin of a man who had once been shot by the defendant.  Voir dire indicated no actual bias on the part of the juror — or even that the juror knew of the shooting — and no motion was made to strike him for cause.  On appeal, however, Brazelton argued that he was entitled to a new trial under the implied bias doctrine, which indicates that close relatives of people with actual bias must be automatically excluded.  The Seventh Circuit (per Judge Coffey) rejected this claim.  After noting uncertainty in the law as to whether second cousins are closely enough related to fall within the scope of the implied bias rule, the court instead decided the case on the basis of Brazelton’s failure to seek removal of the juror at trial.  The court concluded that Brazelton thereby waived any right he had to raise the implied bias claim later.  Along the way, the court noted a Sixth Circuit case indicating that defendants may not waive their right to an impartial jury, thus suggesting the existence of a circuit split on the question.

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