Religious Freedom — or Oppression?

The BBC reports that a group in the U.K. called the Centre for Social Cohesion has issued a report finding that European governments have not done enough to protect the free speech of Muslims from other Muslims.

According to the report, Muslim reformers have not been sufficiently protected from attacks by Muslim extremists, citing as a prime example (but it offers many others) the fatwah against Sir Salman Rushdie for the publication of The Satanic Verses. It called on European governments to treat Muslims “as complete citizens, neither restricted in their freedoms nor unduly permitted to issue threats against others.”

The report suggests, in other words, a kind of multicultural condescension — a view that fatwas and threats of violence are simply the Islamic way and must, at least within the community, be tolerated. Of course, this becomes sort of a self-fulfilling prophecy as Islamic reformers are run off. When the lion is allowed to lie down with the lamb, what follows is usually dinner.

Continue ReadingReligious Freedom — or Oppression?

If The Drew Fits, Charge It?

Being fascinated with both the use (and misuse) of technology and criminal law in general, I have been intently following the Lori Drew case. For those of you who haven’t, however, Drew is the Missouri mother who — as a response to some animus between 13-year-old Megan Meier and Drew’s daughter — created a false persona, “Josh Evans,” on Myspace to flirt with and gain the trust of Meier, then insulted and demeaned her to the point where Meier committed suicide. Missouri state officials reviewed the case, but felt that there was no appropriate state statute under which to bring charges against Drew; federal prosecutors in Missouri declined to charge the case for similar reasons. However, federal prosecutors in California (where Myspace’s servers are located) disagreed; claiming jurisdiction, they charged and were subsequently able to indict Drew under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Specifically, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in California is charging her with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime for anyone to

intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . . . information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.

The indictment can be found here, if anyone is interested in reading it, but the gist of the argument that the AUSAs in California are making is that by giving fictitious profile information, Drew violated Myspace’s Terms of Service, thus “exceeding” the access authorized by Myspace. Then, as she used this fictitious profile to “obtain information” from Myspace’s servers — personal information about Megan, as best as I can tell — to commit the tort of infliction of emotional distress upon Meier, and since to access Myspace’s servers she was required to send packets of data across state lines, she met all the elements of the crime.

Continue ReadingIf The Drew Fits, Charge It?

SCOWIS to Consider Scope of Ministerial Exception

Earlier this fall, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted a petition for review in Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor and Industry Review Commission. The decision below is here. 

The case involves the scope of the ministerial exception to age discrimination claims under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. The complainant, Wendy Ostlund, was a teacher in a Catholic grade school who had been laid off. While certain of her duties were explicitly religious, e.g., she taught religion, led the students in prayer, prepared them for liturgies, and sometimes incorporated religious themes into secular subjects, most of her day was not spend in expressly religious activities.

The Court of Appeals held that the application of the exception turned on whether Ms. Ostlund’s primary duties were minsterial, i.e., did they consist of “teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship . . . .” The exception applies only when a position is “quintessentially religious,” because it is such a position that presents the prospect of making an “inroad on religious liberty” that is “too substantial to be permissible.”

Continue ReadingSCOWIS to Consider Scope of Ministerial Exception