Levels of Transformativeness

Brian Frye has an interesting post up over at Concurring Opinions on Friedman v. Guetta, a recent Central District of California copyright case involving an altered photograph of Run-D.M.C. Somewhat like Fairey v. AP, the issues on summary judgement included whether the original photograph was copyrightable and whether Guetta’s use of it was fair. (You can see the original and altered photographs here.)

There’s lots of interesting issues there, but one that caught my eye is one that has been bugging me more and more every time I teach the fair use section of Copyright Law: the seemingly infinite manipulability of the transformativeness inquiry of the first fair use factor. The fair use exception to copyright infringement liability, as defined in the Copyright Act, requires the court to weigh four factors: the purpose and character of the defendant’s use; the nature of the plaintiff’s work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the effect of the use on the potential market for the plaintiff’s work. The first factor—the purpose and character of the use—is typically determined by looking at whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work was “transformative”—that is, whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s work for some new and different purpose, or whether the defendant’s use merely supplanted the plaintiff’s work.

In resolving the transformativeness issue, much seems to depend on how broadly or narrowly the purposes of the two works are defined, but that categorization is almost never accompanied by any discussion of the proper level of generality. Here’s how Judge Pregerson in Friedman defined the purpose of each work:

Here, Defendant has not offered a transformative alternative use of the Photograph image. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are artists, and the image was used by both in works of visual art for public display. Although the statements made by those respective artworks and the mediums by which those respective statements were made differ, the use itself is not so distinct as to render Defendant’s use a transformation of Plaintiff’s copyright.

“Works of visual art for public display” is a pretty broad category; almost every photograph for any purpose will fit that description. Surely that can’t be the proper level of generality.

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That’s the Same Combination I Have on My Luggage!

Quick, which service do you think has the most strict password requirements I’ve ever encountered? My bank? Mutual funds? My law firm network login? Credit cards? Paypal? Email providers? Configuring my home server for remote access? Electronics sites like newegg.com and amazon.com? Westlaw and Lexis?

No. Not any of those. There is a service that, judging by its password requirements, contains either information far more sensitive or capabilities far more powerful than any of these. It’s…

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Two Models of Sociolegal Change

My article, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System (previously mentioned here and commented on here), is finally out in the current issue of the Alabama Law Review. (Pre-publication version here.) This article represents the end point of a fairly long process that began with a seminar paper in law school. In 1996, I was impressed with the tenor of the debate in Congress over the Defense of Marriage Act; there were several statements to the effect that failing to wall off the status of legally married same-sex couples would lead to the downfall of society. It reminded me strongly of the rhetoric in Dred Scott that recognition of Scott’s citizenship would have calamitous effects. As I dug into it, I found even stronger parallels in antebellum debates in Congress over travelling black Northern citizens in Southern states, and the extension of slavery to the territories. Congress seemed, then as now, appeared alarmed at the prospect of a state-recognized social status to destabilize the societies of states that didn’t recognize that status, merely by virtue of individuals with that status travelling.

The antebellum debates were ultimately resolved by the Fourteenth Amendment, and in particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause. So I wrote a paper about how the Privileges or Immunities Clause had a forgotten purpose that would mediate an entrenched conflict between states over an inconsistently codified sociolegal status. Of course, that argument will have the most contemporary relevance if such a conflict in fact develops. But it’s not at all clear that we are heading that way. There’s another model of sociolegal change when it comes to anxiety over travellers bearing destabilizing statuses: divorce.

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