Copyright Law in Transition
Irene’s post and Kali’s post got me thinking: What is it that interests me about copyright law? The answer is somewhat surprising, given that I specialize in copyright law: nothing, per se. I’m not especially attracted to the doctrine of copyright law more than a number of other subjects, such as torts or contracts or even securities regulation. Indeed, as cocktail party conversation goes, I always cringe a little when I say I specialize in copyright, because it often leads to a discussion of some particular controversy in which I am forced to admit at the end that I have no idea what the answer is, as the statute is vague and there are cases on both sides (or maybe no cases at all). At least there are answers to what constitutes insider trading.
What interests me about copyright is not copyright law in itself, but copyright law as a subject. Over the past few years, I’ve come to realize that my interest in copyright law and Internet law predates law school. It’s part of my general interest in ideological transitions, and in particular turbulent ideological transitions. I’m interested in copyright law for the same reason I’m interested in vigilantes and alterations in foreign policy and systems accidents.

$1,920,000 for filesharing. As reported by the
One tricky situation faced by many academics is how to respond to criticism of their work that the scholar does not believe is accurate or justified. A lot of scholars, in my opinion, don’t do this very effectively. The less effective responses are those in which the author is clearly indignant or angry. A reader who is not intimately familiar with the details is, I think, moved to conclude that the amount of emotion correlates to the degree to which the criticism has met its mark. I’ve always thought that the more persuasive response is one of faint bemusement—faint, because if the tone is openly mocking, that risks the perception among readers that the target did not take the criticism seriously enough.