Why Confess?

Why do suspects confess to the police? Researchers Allison Redlich, Richard Kulish, and Henry Steadman set out to answer this question by interviewing 65 jail inmates who had confessed, slightly more than half of whom claimed to have falsely confessed. The results are reported in their new article “Comparing True and False Confessions Among Persons With Serious Mental Illness,” 17 Psych., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 394 (2011). As the title indicates, the researchers were particularly interested in individuals with serious mental illness, which is a group that has been identified in the literature as especially likely to confess.

What I found most intriguing about the results was the importance of “internal pressure” as a motivation for confessing. This refers to feelings of guilt about the crime, a desire to “get it off one’s chest,” and a belief in the importance of honesty. Among the “true confessors,” guilt/honesty-type answers were the most common when the interviewer asked the open-ended question, “Tell me in your own words, why you confessed?” (403) (Not surprisingly, almost none of the ”false confessors” cited such reasons.) By contrast, “external pressure” (e.g., bullying by the police) was rarely cited by either true or false confessors. (The most common reason given for false confessions was a desire to protect someone else.)

Similarly, when subjects were asked to rate various suggested motivations on a seven-point scale (1 was “not at all” a reason to confess, and 7 was “very much so”), the true confessors rated guilty feelings as among the more important, with an average score of 3.52. (407) 

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Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection as Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A defendant’s right to reasonably competent legal representation is violated when the defendant’s lawyer discriminates on the basis of gender during jury selection, the Seventh Circuit ruled last week inWinston v. Boatwright (No. 10-1156).  The court’s reasoning would presumably apply equally to racial discrimination.  However, because of the peculiarities of federal habeas law, the particular defendant who presented the claim in Winston was unable to obtain any relief.

Here’s what happened.  Winston was charged with sexual assault of a fifteen-year-old girl and convicted by an all-woman jury.  His lawyer had used his seven peremptory strikes to remove six men and one woman from the jury.  As Winston’s post-conviction counsel later discovered, the trial lawyer struck the male jurors because he thought that females would be more critical of the victim.

Apart from the fact that such gender discrimination is illegal, trial counsel’s strategy may actually have been a good one.  Indeed, the jury acquitted Winston of an intercourse charge.

No matter, the Seventh Circuit ruled.  Competent counsel (in the constitutional sense) does not discriminate against men in the exercise of peremptory strikes.  Period.

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Judge Must Explain New Sentencing Decision After Revocation of Supervised Release

As I described here and here, the Seventh Circuit has an interesting line of cases that attempt to establish some minimal standards for the way that district judges explain their sentences.  Add to that line the court’s decision last week in United States v. Robertson (No. 10-3543).  I think that Robertson is the court’s first decision to apply the explanation requirement to a resentencing that occurred after revocation of a defendant’s supervised release.

That the explanation requirement would apply here is perhaps not a given, since, as the court observed, the district judge has even more discretion in this setting than in an original sentencing.  (4)  The court ruled, however, that the district judge must indeed “say something that enables the appellate court to infer that he considered both [the recommendations of the sentencing guidelines and the statutory sentencing factors].”  (4)

In Robertson, the guidelines recommended a term of 12-18 months following the defendant’s revocation for growing marijuana, but the district judge instead imposed a sentence of 34 months.  Here is the “explanation” for the sentence that the Seventh Circuit found inadequate:

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