SCOTUS to Rule on Meaning of “Cocaine Base”

In a 1986 law that must surely rate as one of Congress’s most ill-informed overreactions to a high-profile tragedy– the cocaine-related death of college basketball star Len Bias — a new mandatory minimum ten-year sentence was created for drug offenders involved in dealing 50 or more grams of “cocaine base.”  Never mind that Bias used the powder form of cocaine.  Never mind that crack — the form of cocaine that everyone was most concerned about at the time — is only one type of cocaine base.  Congress instead chose to direct the harsh new penalties at cocaine base, a category that is narrower than all cocaine, but broader than just crack (at least if the term ”cocaine base” is understood literally).  As is now well known, the result of this unfortunate law has been to create massive racial disparities in federal drug sentencing between white defendants (who are typically involved with powder) and black defendants (who are more typically involved with crack). 

Although “cocaine base” cases normally involve what is undisputably crack, defendants have from time to time litigated whether a particular susbtance really triggers the ten-year minimum.  These cases have produced a longstanding circuit split, with six circuits (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth) reading “cocaine base” to encompass all forms cocaine that are chemically classified as a base, and five circuits holding that “cocaine base” means more narrowly what Congress was really concerned about, i.e., crack and other types of smokable cocaine base.  With today’s cert. grant in DePierre v. United States, 599 U.S. 25 (1st Cir. 2010), the Supreme Court appears poised finally to resolve the issue. 

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Racial Disparities and Risk Assessment

Bernard Harcourt (University of Chicago) has an interesting new paper entitled “Risk as a Proxy for Race.”  (A copy is available here on SSRN.)  Harcourt is responding to progressive arguments in favor of tying prison release to risk assessment:

An increasing chorus argues, today, that risk-assessment instruments are a politically feasible method to redress our problem of mass incarceration and reduce prison populations.  The argument, in essence, is that prediction tools can identify low-risk offenders for release and thereby protect correctional authorities from the political whiplash of early release.

Harcourt’s concern is that risk-based early release opportunities will disproportionately benefit white inmates and thereby exacerbate racial disparities in the prison population.  He points out, “[R]isk today has collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race.” 

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New Right-to-Counsel Rulings Address Bail and Waiver

State courts in Maryland and Indiana have recently broken new ground in the right-to-counsel area.  First, a trial judge in Baltimore ruled inRichmond v. District Court that indigent defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel at bail hearings.  The decision is described in more detail at The Blog of Legal Times.  Additional coverage appears in The Daily Record.

Second, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in Hopper v. State that defendants who wish to waive their right to counsel and plead guilty must be advised of the benefits of having a lawyer during plea negotiations.  The United States Supreme Court had previously rejected such “formulaic” requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).  However, unlikeTovar, the new case was decided not on Sixth Amendment grounds but on the basis of the Indiana Supreme Court’s general supervisory authority over lower state courts.

If it is affirmed on appeal and replicated in other jurisdictions, the Baltimore ruling is likely the more significant of the two.  

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