Sentence Explanation in the Seventh Circuit: What’s Good for the Goose . . .

Ever since the Supreme Court converted the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to advisory in 2005, I’ve followed with particular interest the case law on how sentences must be explained in the new regime.  Even more specifically, I have focused on the question of when sentencing judges are required to respond expressly to defendants’ arguments for lenience.  (See, for example, my post here.)  I’ve also wondered about the flipside of that question — when must judges respond expressly to prosecutors’ arguments in aggravation? — but cases on this seem far less common.  Last week, though, the Seventh Circuit addressed an issue that seems closely related to my hypothetical question.

In United States v. Glosser (No. 08-4015), the judge made a promise to the defendant at his change-of-plea hearing that he would impose the statutory minimum 120-month sentence in the case, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s suggestion that the government might seek more.  And, indeed, it turned out that the government sought a 210-month sentence in light of firearms found at Glosser’s resident.  The judge, however, mostly stuck to his promise and imposed a 121-month sentence.  The government appealed. 

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Wrong Advice About Civil Commitment Law Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Last spring, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Padilla v. Kentucky that an attorney’s incorrect advice regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea might violate the client’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  Padilla was a surprisingly broadly worded expansion of the Sixth Amendment right into the realm of advice on the collateral consequences of a conviction.  Although Padilla raised more questions than it answered, the decision may prove an extraordinarily important one in light of the proliferation of collateral consequences over the past couple of decades.

Now the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that Padilla does indeed extend beyond deportation advice.  In Bauder v. Dep’t of Corrections (No. 10-10657), the court affirmed a grant of habeas relief based on an attorney’s incorrect advice that the petitioner would not face the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent predator if he pled no contest to a stalking charge.

In addition to its extension of the Padilla reasoning to a new collateral consequence, Bauder strikes me as quite significant for at least two reasons.  

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