Supreme Court Weighs in on Issue Preclusion in Criminal Cases

supreme_court_buildingThe Supreme Court managed to reach a unanimous decision today in a death penalty case, Bobby v. Bies. Back in 1996, while reviewing Bies’ sentence, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s “mild to borderline mental retardation merit[s] some weight in mitigation,” but affirmed his sentence anyway.  Six years later, of course, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of the mentally retarded.  The Ohio courts sensibly responded to Atkins by ordering a hearing to determine whether Bies was indeed retarded for Eighth Amendment purposes.  But Bies preempted the hearing by persuading a federal court that the issue had already been decided in his favor by the Ohio Supreme Court and that relitigation was precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  After this decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court today reversed, holding there was no Double Jeopardy bar to the proposed Atkins hearing.

A couple of reactions.  First, as a unanimous decision in such a politically charged area as the death penalty, Bies is a nice reminder — amidst the high emotions and free-flowing hyperbole surrounding the Sotomayor nomination — that justices from across the ideological spectrum can and (at least at times) do set aside policy preferences to reach consensus right answers.

Second, although I’m pretty well convinced the Court got the right answer with respect to Bies, the opinion swept more broadly than it had to, perhaps unnecessarily limiting the Double Jeopardy issue preclusion doctrine. Is this one of those instances of “easy cases make bad law”?

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week

seventh-circuit1With only one new opinion in a criminal case, there’s not much to choose from.  Unfortunately, United States v. Sainz-Preciado (No. 07-3706) was a fairly routine case that broke no new legal ground.  In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Tinder) affirmed the defendant’s 262-month sentence for cocaine trafficking over various objections to the way the guidelines sentence was calculated and imposed.

One aspect of the case merits at least brief comment.  The defendant was awarded only a two-point, not the possible three-point, reduction in offense level under the sentencing guidelines for “acceptance of responsibility.”  The third point requires a motion from the government, and the government did not make such a motion for Sainz-Preciado.  Normally, defendants who enter a timely guilty plea, as Sainz-Preciadio did, receive the full acceptance benefit.  However, Sainz-Preciado was penalized by the government for contesting his responsibility at the sentencing hearing for drug deals that he was not even charged with.  This is a nice reminder for defense counsel of the perils of challenging “relevant conduct” at sentencing — and, to invoke one of Justice Scalia’s favorite themes, of the extent to which the guidelines system has replaced the common-law values of adversarial testing of evidence with the bureaucratic values of efficient case-processing.

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It Takes Two to Tango

Historically, courts have declined to impose aiding and abetting liability regarding crimes for which two parties are essential to commission.  As the Model Penal Code puts it, accomplice liability does not extend to conduct that is “inevitably incident” to the main offense; more colloquially, accomplice liability will not apply to crimes for which it “takes two to tango.”  Thus, a buyer of drugs for personal use does not aid or abet the dealer’s distribution; a woman who voluntarily accompanies a man across state lines for purposes of prostitution does not facilitate his violation of the Mann Act; the patron of a speakeasy does not aid and abet the illegal sale of alcohol.  And, as of today, a person who telephones a drug trafficker to order cocaine for personal use does not violate 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Section 843(b) offenses are commonly known as “phone counts.”  The statute makes it a felony, punishable by up to four years in prison, to knowingly or intentionally  use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under the Controlled Substances Act.  Some Circuits, including the Seventh, had held that a buyer’s use of the phone in purchasing drugs “facilitates” the seller’s (felony) drug distribution within the meaning of § 843(b).  Today, in Abuelhawa v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress, legislating in light of the common-law tradition discussed above, did not intend such a result.  Although the term “facilitate” could be subject to the broad construction urged by the government, the Court found that Congress likely intended the term “facilitate” to be construed similar to “aid and abet.”  The Court noted that Congress generally made simple drug possession a misdemeanor, and transforming misdemeanor possession into a felony simply because a phone was involved would skew “the congressional calibration of respective buyer-seller penalties.”

Phone counts are often used as a means of resolving cases involving greater charges, like conspiracy to distribute.  In those situations, even if the caller is primarily a user, he may intend at least some of the drugs for re-distribution, or he may be middling transactions for others.  But simply using the phone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase is (now) outside the scope of the statute.

Continue ReadingIt Takes Two to Tango
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