Halloween Frights

It’s Halloween, so children have dreams of scaring adults, and adults have nightmares about other adults harming children. Lawmakers in Missouri this year have been concerned about a particular kind of harm: sexual offenses against children. They passed a state law that prohibited convicted sexual offenders from having any “Halloween-related contact with children,” and required the offenders to remain at their homes on Halloween night between the trick-or-treat hours of 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. unless they have “just cause” for leaving. The law did not define either “just cause” or “Halloween-related contact.” The law also required sexual offenders to turn off any porch lights and to post signs stating “no candy or treats at this residence.”

On Monday a federal judge issued an order blocking most parts of the statute as unclear, leaving in place only the provisions requiring that porch lights be extinguished and that there be a sign announcing that no candy would be given out at the offenders’ residences. Opponents of the law had argued that it was unclear; for example, did it prohibit contact between the sexual offenders and their own children on Halloween even if such contact would not be prohibited on other days? Would a convicted sexual offender have to avoid the decoration section of stores if children were there picking out their pumpkins? Opponents also argued that the law was an unfair double punishment for a crime for which a sentence had already been served.

Did the court make the right decision? I would say yes.

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Seventh Circuit Week in Review (With a Brief Digression on Criminal Justice Federalism)

The Seventh Circuit issued only one new criminal opinion in the past week.  In United States v. Robinson, the defendant’s ex-girlfriend (Evans) reported to a Milwaukee police officer that Robinson had a gun in his home, a charge that was later confirmed after the officer obtained a warrant to search Robinson’s residence.  Robinson was then convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  On appeal, he argued that the cop who applied for the search warrant should have disclosed that Evans had recently been charged with disorderly conduct for threatening Robinson with a knife.  In Robinson’s view, had the judicial officer known the history of conflict between Evans and Robinson, the officer would have discounted the credibility of Evans’ allegation that Robinson had a gun and declined to issue the search warrant.  At a minimum, Robinson argued that he was entitled to a hearing on the matter under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

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Why Don’t We Punish People Who Kill in Self-Defense?

My colleague Janie Kim has a fascinating new article on SSRN called The Rhetoric of Self-Defense. In the article, she explores a surprising difficult problem in criminal law theory: why we don’t punish people who kill in order to save themselves from deadly attacks. I say “surprisingly difficult” because the self-protection defense is a well-established, noncontroversial aspect of criminal law. Compared to, say, the insanity defense, self-protection provokes little deep-seated opposition. Indeed, some purported self-defenders (like Bernhard Goetz, pictured above) have become folk heroes of sorts. Given its intuitive appeal and widespread support, the self-protection defense must rest on a firm theoretical foundation, right?

It turns out, though, that the dominant strands of criminal law theory have a hard time providing a compelling justification for the defense.

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