Seventh Circuit Revisits the Second Amendment

Here’s another one to file under “no, we don’t want a revolution.”  A few days ago, I posted on a new Seventh Circuit opinion that seemed to adopt a minimalist reading of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carr v. United States.  Over a vigorous dissent, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the validity of pre-Carr decisions regarding the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.  Now, the Seventh Circuit has a new opinion that reaffirms the validity of a gun-control statute, and another dissent accuses the court of incorrectly limiting a recent Supreme Court decision.

Last year, I posted on the interesting panel decision in United States v. Skoien, in which the Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court for the government to attempt to justify 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in the face of the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge.  The panel relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.  However, the government successfully sought en banc review, and now the en banc court has decided simply to affirm Skoien’s conviction without further proceedings. 

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Baby, You Can Drive My Carr . . . Or Maybe Not

The ink is barely dry on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carr v. United States, and already we have a contentious case in the Seventh Circuit questioning its meaning.  In Carr, the Court had to interpret a notoriously clumsy bit of legislation from 2006, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (part of the so-called Adam Walsh Act).  SORNA makes it a federal crime for a person who is required to register as a sex offender to (1) travel in interstate commerce, and (2) knowingly fail to register or update a registration.  In Carr, the Court held that a person may not be convicted under SORNA based on travel that occurred prior to SORNA’s enactment.

At the time Carr was decided, the Seventh Circuit already had pending before it United States v. Vasquez.  Vasquez was convicted of a SORNA violation on the basis of stipulated facts that showed (1) he failed to register as a sex offender as he was required to do in Illinois, and (2) he subsequently traveled from Illinois to California for some undetermined purpose.  On appeal, Vasquez argued that the statute required the government to prove he had knowledge of his federal registration obligation, and that the statute exceeded Congress’s regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.

The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments in a majority opionion authored by Judge Bauer. 

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Arizona’s Big Mistake

Arizona recently passed into law provisions that make a person’s illegal presence in the state of Arizona — currently a civil violation under federal law — a crime under state law.  The Arizona law also provides for the arrest of persons where the police have a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is unlawfully present and where the individual cannot produce the proper documentation.  Last minute changes  were made to the law this past Friday in order to prohibit the use of racial or ethnic profiling by police in determining who to stop and question, and to clarify that questions about an individual’s immigration status should only be asked as part of an investigation of non-immigration related violations.  These changes to the original language were made to try and stave off several threatened lawsuits intended to challenge the constitutionality of the Arizona law.  

These changes to the law may diminish the likelihood that the Arizona state statute will be found to violate the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.  However, the most likely ground for a ruling that the Arizona law violates the Constitution was, and remains, that any state attempt to regulate the border is preempted by the pervasive scheme of federal immigration legislation.  While many observers will anxiously await the outcome of these constitutional challenges, it is important to recognize that there is a separate and more fundamental reason why the Arizona law is a mistake.  The law perpetuates a trend by our elected officials, identified by Professor Jennifer Chacon and others, that mistakenly conflates the criminal law with immigration law.  The convergence between these two separate areas of the law began in the 1990s and gathered momentum after September 11, 2001.  This process needs to be stopped and reversed.

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