Laboratories of Democracy at the Local Level

Matt Parlow has a thought-provoking new article in print: Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 371 (2008).  (A draft can be downloaded here.)  Matt contends that the oft-quoted argument of Justice Brandeis (pictured to the left) that states may appropriately serve as laboraties for “novel social and economic experiments” applies equally well — indeed, perhaps even better — to cities and other local units of government.  Citing recent immigration initiatives and living wage ordinances (including one in Madison, Wisconsin), Matt notes a long history of local-level policy innovation in this country.  He argues,

Because they are smaller in size, local governments are more capable of being responsive to the needs of their respective communities because they are more in touch with their constituents.  This leads, in theory, to more responsive and representative policy-making as local government officials make decisions informed by the community’s wants and needs.

In light of these considerations, Matt argues against the tendency of some courts to squelch local initiatives through narrow constructions of home rule powers and liberal invocations of the implied preemption doctrine.

All of this connects nicely to the recent, lively discussion on this Blog of Milwaukee’s ballot initiative mandating paid sick leave for employees.  I take it that Matt would be skeptical of arguments that the Milwaukee law is preempted by state and federal law — at the least, his analysis would suggest some good reasons why a court ought to be slow to find preemption. 

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If The Drew Fits, Charge It?

Being fascinated with both the use (and misuse) of technology and criminal law in general, I have been intently following the Lori Drew case. For those of you who haven’t, however, Drew is the Missouri mother who — as a response to some animus between 13-year-old Megan Meier and Drew’s daughter — created a false persona, “Josh Evans,” on Myspace to flirt with and gain the trust of Meier, then insulted and demeaned her to the point where Meier committed suicide. Missouri state officials reviewed the case, but felt that there was no appropriate state statute under which to bring charges against Drew; federal prosecutors in Missouri declined to charge the case for similar reasons. However, federal prosecutors in California (where Myspace’s servers are located) disagreed; claiming jurisdiction, they charged and were subsequently able to indict Drew under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Specifically, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in California is charging her with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime for anyone to

intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . . . information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.

The indictment can be found here, if anyone is interested in reading it, but the gist of the argument that the AUSAs in California are making is that by giving fictitious profile information, Drew violated Myspace’s Terms of Service, thus “exceeding” the access authorized by Myspace. Then, as she used this fictitious profile to “obtain information” from Myspace’s servers — personal information about Megan, as best as I can tell — to commit the tort of infliction of emotional distress upon Meier, and since to access Myspace’s servers she was required to send packets of data across state lines, she met all the elements of the crime.

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Seventh Circuit Week in Review

The Seventh Circuit had two new opinions in criminal cases this week, with the government winning both.  (Since I started this Week in Review series three weeks ago, the government has gone 10-0 — an even better run than the Tennessee Titans have been enjoying.  Let’s hope the Packers don’t have the U.S. Department of Justice coming up on their schedule!) 

In United States v. Anderson (No. 07-3654), the court considered a bank robber’s request for appointment of an expert to evaluate his mental health.  The district court had denied the request, and the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Posner) affirmed.  Normally, we think of mental health evaluations in connection with the insanity defense or determinations of competency to stand trial, but Anderson wanted an expert to help him advance a sentencing argument, specifically, that he suffered from diminished mental capacity at the time of his bank robbery.  (And the fact that he did rob a bank provides prima facie evidence of diminished capacity: bank robbers are successfully apprehended at a much higher rate than most other criminals.  As I tell my students, if you want to steal money, there are a lot smarter ways to do it than to rob a bank!) 

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